Marine Corps Gazette

April 1952

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

Marine Corps Gazette

APRIL 1952

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Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor that of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

THIS MONTH'S COVER: It was a year ago that the Chinese Communists launched their much-vaunted but ill-fated counteroffensive in Korea. Their failure to push UN forces off the peninsula, despite human sea tactics, was a significant prelude to the current armistice negotiations.

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MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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THIS MONTH AND NEXT—Next month the GAZETTE will have a new editor and publisher—Major Carl E. Walker, recently of the 2d Bn, 1st Marines. Major Walker takes over with the GAZETTE at a record circulation of 58,000, roughly as much as the combined circulations of *Combat Forces Journal* and *Naval Institute Proceedings*, its Army and Navy counterparts. The GAZETTE's reputation is second to no other professional military journal.

The only way Major Walker can keep the GAZETTE on the uptrend is through *you readers.* Continue reading and commenting and, above all, keep thinking and sending those excellent articles. With your help the GAZETTE will attain greater success.

To readers and advertisers, my sincere thanks for your support.

J. A. POUNDS, III

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TO THE EDITOR

Message Center

Cruel Only To Be Kind . . .



Dear Sir:

At first reading, Sergeant Albertson's letter in the GAZETTE for September appeared to send us straight back to Frederick the Great's grim dictum, that "The moment an Officer appears on the parade ground, every man in the ranks should tremble." A second reading brought greater enlightenment, and found one murmuring Prince Rupert's rueful comment, "A soldier's life is a life of honour, but a dog would not lead it."

Of *course* compulsion brings men into the Service, although with that type of individual we term "a born soldier," I should prefer to call it impulse. Of *course* it is compulsion that spurs a man into action; compulsion nicely compounded of that "combat instinct" which training has done its very utmost to cultivate and technically perfect—in plain terms, the itch to get the better of the other fellow before he gets the better of you—response to good leadership, and the ordinary decency with which most men are endowed, that refuses to let the team down.

Agreed, "don't baby them." And don't make life out of the line too soft, with cinemas and bun-waggons and what-not, or life *in* the line will, through the absence of such amenities, prove harder than it would have done had deliberately cultivated "austerity" in the back areas anticipated the inescapable "austerity" of up-front. In this particular, we must "be cruel only to be kind"; which seems to bring us back again to Prince Rupert!

REGINALD HARGREAVES,
Maj (ret), British Service

The "Big Three" in Chow . . .

Dear Sir:

I have just read the November issue of the GAZETTE. The article by 1stLt Canzona particularly pleased me. His *Reflections on Korea* was excellent. It's heartening to know that there is someone in a position to get into print who has such a fine appreciation of the situation here. Of course, we realize that everyone is cognizant of the defects in equipment, but we like to hear someone admit it. I would like to add just a few items to the lieutenant's critique.

When in reserve, a training schedule is SOP. Invariably the schedule entails much repetition—the average Marine has sat through so many basic map-reading classes that they either bore him to distraction or put him to sleep. It seems to me that instead of such superfluous repetition, some time could be devoted to current events, foreign policy, (although its doubtful whether *anyone* can explain that) and especially Communism. Not just a definition of pure Communism and its ideals, but a background and explanation of Soviet Communism and the unholy goal which its followers seek with such fanatic zeal.

The second subject I'd like to discuss is quite familiar—C-rations. It seems that a certain assortment, namely meat and noodles, meat and beans, and corned beef hash, is particularly unpopular with the *majority* of line troops. In fact it's commonly called the "Big Three". The sad part is that these three are the most common. Very often, three "Big Three's" are found in the case of rations, never less than two. Why? No doubt, there are many people who like corned beef hash, but I've yet to find them.

HARRY S. MCDONALD,
Sgt, USMCR

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

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Appraisal from Downstairs . . .

Dear Sir:

The editors of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE certainly believe in getting off on the—in our esoteric case—left foot. The first issue of the GAZETTE in 1952 is by far the finest edition I have had the privilege of laying my eyes on in many a moon. Had I only known, all my Christmas shopping would have been done on a subscription blank.

I can't wait to sink my teeth into some of that succulent hot chow of which Col Morgan spoke. The modification of the old pyramidal suggested by 1stLt Edward L. Constantine irrecusably proves that guys are still in there pitching for the Corps. (Quartermaster take note.) LtCol Hittle has again palletized a large chunk of important history for those of us that can't stretch out the day long enough to read it.

However, the cynosure of the issue, *Qualities in Officers NCOs Expect,* deserves the praise of all of those that care. Never before have I been more clearly and honestly appraised of the qualities that are expected of officers . . . and brother, I've been appraised plenty (from upstairs). The words of MSgt Crumb ring with sincerity, and are as compelling as the singing of the Sirens. His requirements are justly high. They should—in the vernacular—be given the widest dissemination.

THEODORE D. HESS,
Capt, USMC

ED: The tenor of your letter makes it irrecusably acceptable for this column. Thanks.

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

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Tie Clasps For Marines . . .

Dear Sir:

I read with great interest the letter of Capt Stanford titled "Ornaments, Patches, and Ties . . ." in the October *Message Center*. I agree with the captain that there should be some Corps identification on the summer service uniform.

During WW II, I was stationed for some time at Fort Belvoir, Va., and attended one of their All-Hands dances. At that time Marine officers wore blouses so I was correctly identified, but there was an unfortunate enlisted Marine there who had to keep his cap on all evening so as not to be confused with the soldiers. The newly-authorized collar ornaments on enlisted uniforms is a step in the right direction.

Why not adopt a bronze tie clasp, bearing the Marine Corps emblem, for both officers and enlisted? This would be a handsome and useful identification badge, and would have the further advantage that it could be worn with civilian clothing.

ROBERT S. MAYO,
Maj, USMC

The Signal Pistol . . .

Dear Sir:

I compliment 1stLt Barrett on his excellently presented article (GAZETTE—October, 1951) and I agree with him 100 per cent.

As a rifle platoon commander and later executive officer of Charlie Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, I have encountered quite a number of situations when a signal pistol would have been an invaluable aid. On one occasion last June our company was assigned the mission of securing a steep, heavily-wooded ridge. Prior to reaching our objective the company had to cross an open valley, in which there were two tanks to support our attack. The company commander decided to attack with two platoons forward, each one advancing up opposite sides of the ridges. Since the terrain was so heavily wooded, it was difficult for the tankers and machine gunners firing in support to observe the troops, and upon their reaching the ridge, the trees prevented them from being seen by the tankers. The platoon leaders could not contact the supporting elements via radio because the SCR-536 failed to function, consequently the attack had to be momentarily halted so that a runner could run back to the tanks and cause their fire to be lifted. The supporting fire soon lifted, the assault ensued, and the ridge was secured. Fortunately, the brief halt did not alter the success of the mission, but it very easily could have. If the assault platoon commanders had been equipped with signal pistols, then they would only have had to fire a specified color flare, and the supporting fire could have immediately been lifted. The signal flare is very dependable, and it would almost entirely eliminate such unnecessary delay as described above.

NORMAN W. HICKS,
1stLt, USMC

Where's 3/11? . . .



Dear Sir:

Your recent article *Breakout From The Reservoir— Marine Epic of Fire and Ice*, by Lynn Montross, has been read and re-read with great interest. However, there is one LARGE ERROR. You have failed to show in your map of Yudam-ni the position of the 3d Bn, 11th Marines. The battalion was given the responsibility to defend that portion of the perimeter from Dog Co, 7th Marines to the edge of the Reservoir. The enclosed overlay gives the exact position.

On second thought, could it be that 3/11 is incorporated into the 7th Marines? I dubbed the battalion 4th Bn, 7th Marines at Hagaru-ri on the move to Yudam-ni. From that time on we were called 4/7 and considered by the 7th Marines as their 4th battalion throughout the campaign.

N. A. MILLER, JR.,
LtCol, USMC

P.S. 3/11 was the first artillery battalion to reach Yudam-ni and the last artillery battalion to return to Hagaru-ri.

Wrong Caption . . .

Dear Sir:

I am writing in reference to a picture appearing on page 7, lower right, of the December 1951 copy of GAZETTE. The picture is described as the harbor installations being blown sky high. I feel certain this is a picture of the disaster which struck Pink Beach at approximately 1300, 24 December 1950, as the very last Army troops were being evacuated from the beach.

I was an AmTrac platoon leader in the 1st Mar Div at this time and was helping to transport the remaining troops to the waiting ships from Pink Beach.

The picture in the GAZETTE compares closely with a snapshot of the actual explosion as taken from a ship in the harbor.

There were actually four explosions, the first of which was of greatest volume and came from four huge stacks of 4.2 mortar ammo and 155mm increments.

The unofficial report of casualties was 25 killed and several score injured. Marine AmTrac personnel suffered one officer killed and several enlisted injured. Three LVT(3)s were destroyed, along with several Navy LCVPs.

W. E. STRAULEY,
1stLt, USMC

ED: You were certainly closer to the blast than the editors who got their information from the back of the photo.

Most Important Form . . .

Dear Sir:

I noticed in your December 1951 issue of the GAZETTE, that a major had sent the GAZETTE an idea concerning the enlisted fitness report. Such things concern me because I work in the Forms Section, Headquarters Marine Corps. My interest is not only because I am in forms work, but I am of the opinion that all officers should be more concerned about any recommended changes that will simplify the fitness reports of officers and enlisted.

I am of the opinion that if officers and enlisted personnel knew the importance of fitness reports and how they affect individuals in regards to promotions and other factors, more emphasis and time would be devoted to fitness reports, not the format only, but to filling them out.

Any information concerning changes of forms should be mailed to Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code ABP), Washington 25, D. C., or to the division or department concerned at Headquarters Marine Corps, with a sample format. This applies to any form used by the Marine Corps, no matter what it is used for, or who it is used by. Fitness reports are the prime concern due to the fact careers are governed by selection board jackets at Headquarters Marine Corps.

WILLIS L. KAY,
1stLt, USMC

ED: Have you read *If You Weren't Selected* in the February GAZETTE?

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British Marine Wants GAZETTE . . .

Dear Sir:

I have just recently had the good fortune to get hold of a copy of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and must compliment you on a really fine magazine. However, to come to the point, I have been wondering if it is at all possible for me to obtain future issues of your GAZETTE direct. I appreciate that currency consideration may debar me from subscribing and venture to suggest that there may be a fellow Marine with the same idea as myself with regard to the Royal Marines magazine, the Globe and Laurel. When I say that I have recently returned from Korea where I met your fine force, and consequently read many of your magazines (the enemy permitting), you may see why I make this request.

In the fond hope that you may see your way to assisting me in this matter, I remain

RONALD W. HICKLING,
Cpl, RM

ED: Printing your letter in this column should solve your problem (see box, page 2). Just say the word and we'll enter your name for a 20-month subscription in lieu of sending the money.

Connecting File . . .

Dear Sir:

Enclosed you will find a check for eight dollars. I would like to subscribe to the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE for a period of one year. With the other five dollars, I would like to purchase the 1951 bound volume of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.

I was with D Co, 2d Bn, 1st Marines from November 1948 until September 1951, and never have I missed the infantry and the men that make it what it is as much as I do now. The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, thanks to you, has brought me as close as I'll ever be again to being in the field with the best outfit in the world. Thanks again.

FRANCIS D. BENNETT, II,
Cpl, USMC

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

The main library at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia strongly desires to obtain the following books, which are now out of print and unavailable through the regular purchasing sources. These books would be of great interest and value to our readers. Can you help us out?

Old Gimlet Eye By MajGen Smedley Butler

A Marine Tells It To You By Col Frederic May Wise

Reminiscences Of A Marine By MajGen John A. Lejeune

With The Help Of God And A Few Marines By BrigGen W. A. Catlin (1919)

Medals Of Honor By James Hopper, John Day publication (1929)

Any books by LtCol John W. Thomason, especially *Fix Bayonets.*

L. C. Hays, Jr.,
Col, USMC

Ed: *Fix Bayonets* can be obtained through the Gazette Bookshop.

Swears by "536"? . . .

Dear Sir:

I disagree strongly with Capt Bryant's article *Let's Use What We Have* which appeared in the December Gazette.

In the first place, the SCR-300 has just about replaced the SCR-536 in our "active" rifle companies. Capt Bryant might play with them in the States, but any company commander in Korea who would like to know what his platoon patrol is meeting 2,000 meters away sends along a "300". Why? Because it works! Contrary to Capt Bryant's ideas, most company commanders don't swear *by* the "536", they swear *at* it!

Secondly, the SCR-536 isn't "ultra-portable," as any rifle platoon commander will readily testify. My idea of an ultra-portable set would be one the same size as the "536", but which could be attached to the pack, with a small mouthpiece and earphones for use under the parka hood.

Actually, the SCR-300 does quite well for everyone in the company but the radioman who has to tote it. What we really need is a lighter version of this radio.

In regards to tank communications, a recently returned tank platoon commander told me our radios held up well, but the M-26 Sherman still has one distinct flaw: the infantry-to-tank phone line is too short. When the tanks are drawing their usual large volume of fire, the tankers can stay "buttoned-up" and still continue their mission, but it takes a well-nigh bulletproof fire team leader to man the phone for more than a few moments. The 1st Mar Div's M-46 Patton is rapidly proving that the longer cord supplies infantry "eyes" for the tank for a longer period of time.

Granted that it is a far simpler task to berate an item of equipment than it is to design its successor, but then again, it is slightly silly to chant pages full of "Let's use what we have" when we could use the same time to think constructively about what improvements could be made.

W. J. Davis,
1stLt, USMC

Russian Bear Story . . .

Dear Sir:

Your January 1952 Gazette contained an article which should be required reading for all members of Marine Corps Schools. It is LtCol Hittle's *Background for Russian Action.*

A very clear, well written, and factual article like this merits a place where more of our leaders must be required to take time to read and study their opponent. I hope more such articles will come from the same author. History should not be ignored. We must learn the past and the present of Russia.

Arch D. Barnes,
Capt, USMCR

Dear Sir:

I have found LtCol Hittle's article, *Background for Russian Acton,* in the January Gazette one of the most interesting, instructive, and informative I have ever read.

It is as cogent as a Mahan lecture.

Best wishes to the Gazette and its efficient staff.

J. M. Ellicott,
Capt, USN (Ret)

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COLONIAL AIRLINES	ROBINSON AIRLINES
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES	SOUTHERN AIRWAYS
DELTA AIR LINES	SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS
EASTERN AIR LINES	TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
EMPIRE AIR LINES	TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS
FRONTIER AIRLINES	UNITED AIR LINES
INLAND AIR LINES	WEST COAST AIRLINES
LAKE CENTRAL AIRLINES	WESTERN AIR LINES
MID-CONTINENT AIRLINES	WISCONSIN CENTRAL AIRLINES

I.D. Tag Supply . . .

Dear Sir:

Many problems connected with the administration of an FMF unit in the field re-occur with regularity and there seems to be no solution to this. However, occasionally an individual closely connected with one or more of these problems comes up with an idea for a possible solution. More often than not such an idea is laughed off and soon forgotten. To prevent that, in this case, I suggested to the Sergeant Major, 2d Bn, 5th Marines, MSgt William J. Yanovitch that he present his idea for a solution to the continuing ID tag supply problem to your magazine. He has asked that I do it for him and it is my pleasure to do so.

If anyone has ever had experience with a missing-ID-tag case involving a Marine killed in action, wherein a report of missing in action was necessary; or worse, wherein a Marine was reported killed in action (I recall an article in *Leatherneck* magazine of a few months back dealing with the subject), he will echo the sergeant major's concern over repeated submission of rosters for ID tags, the submission of which rosters seems never to have the desired result.

The bottleneck in the supply of these essential tags seems to be the availability of the machine required to produce the tags: To eliminate this bottleneck, Sergeant Major Yanovitch suggests that a supply of these machines be furnished to the engineer unit, to be carried by, or in the same manner as, the small arms and ordnance repair units that make periodic visits to all units. His suggestion warrants consideration in my opinion and presents a possible solution to the problem. Marines have always taken care of Marines in admirable fashion in the past, and the addition of this task to the engineer units (or such unit as might be selected) would make Marines responsible to Marines for another important service, and only good should come of that!

This letter is not meant as a criticism of the organization presently assigned the task of producing these tags since it is not known definitely who has that responsibility. I have served with this organization for three months and have seen rosters submitted to at least two sources (only through normal channels, of course) but I have yet to see a tag delivered.

Warren F. Lloyd,
Maj, USMC



KOREAN SERIES

The Gazette regrets that its series of official accounts of Marine fighting in Korea has been suspended temporarily. *The Chinese Counteroffensive of April 1951*, scheduled for this issue, was sidetracked for security reasons. In conjunction with Historical Section, Headquarters, Marine Corps, we hope to resume the series within 60 days. Full treatment of the 1st Marine Air Wing's close support role is planned as well as the work of supporting arms.

The Editors.

Superb Men . . .

Dear Sir:

Just a brief note to tell you how much I personally have enjoyed the fruits of your labor during the last five years.

The Gazette is without a doubt the outstanding service publication that I have come across, in fairly wide reading of such things.

I have always had a desire to see a complete issue devoted to the training of the Marine Corps enlisted man. The thing I have in mind would be historical (with plenty of old photographs); would contain first-hand detailed information as to the methods used at Parris Island and San Diego; would be liberally contributed to by the men who have actually done the work over the years; and would in general conclusion, try to refresh all officers of the Marine Corps as to why the men always look so good when anything has to be done!

Countless times, I have heard Bowser, Weller, Carvell Hall, Duncan Waller, and many, many others (even Bennie Barnes in a letter a few weeks ago from Korea) state that no matter what job was given them, the "men" were absolutely superb and, of course, got it done.

Clement B. Newbold,
Philadelphia, Pa.

The second printing of LEATHERHEAD has been exhausted. As a result, the Gazette has withdrawn its offer of this cartoon book on boot camp as a bonus for two-year subscriptions and renewals.

Only a few remaining copies of the 25,000 printed are available for purchase at $1.00.

Zero in on Pepsi

and you'll get...

MORE BOUNCE TO THE OUNCE

WHY TAKE LESS . . . WHEN PEPSI'S BEST

Notes on Our Authors



MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, CB, CBE, DSO, author of *The Strange Story of the CDL Tank*, page 15, was born in Chichester, Sussex, in 1878. He served throughout the Boer War and in India from 1903 to 1906. In 1916, after serving in various staff positions in France, he was named Chief General Staff Officer to the new Tank Corps, with responsibility for tank tactics at the battles of Cambrai and Amicus. In 1929, Gen Fuller was appointed to command of a brigade at Wiesbaden and later at Catterick. He was promoted to major general in 1930 and retired in 1933. Gen Fuller served as military correspondent for the London *Daily Mail* in the first half of the Italo-Abyssinian War, and in 1936 and 1938 was in Spain during the Civil War there. He is the author of 36 books and many articles.

1stLt Henry J. Witkowski was a platoon leader with the 5th Marines in Korea when he wrote the provocative article on page 20, *Why Build a Bunker?* He entered the Marine Corps 10 July 1941 and served as a corporal with the 2d Mar Div on Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Tarawa, later joining the V-12 unit at the University of Michigan. He was commissioned at Quantico 3 April 1946. A native of Cudahy, Wisconsin, Lt Witkowski holds the Navy Cross, British Distinguished Service Medal, and Presidential Unit Citation with star.

Author of *Lessons Learned Up North*, page 42, is 1stLt W. J. Davis, who was a mortar section leader with the 7th Marines in Korea and currently is with the G-1 Section, HQMC. After commissioning at Quantico in 1948, he served as platoon leader with the 9th Marines on Guam, CO of the American Embassy guard at Nanking, and then back to a platoon with the 5th Marines on Guam. Lt Davis holds the Silver Star, Letter of Commendation with "V," and Presidential Unit Citation. He hails from Stoneham, Massachusetts, and is a graduate of Penn State University.

Capt Cyril D. Jeffcoat, author of *Switchboard for Sound Waves*, on page 56, holds the reputation of being the first Marine radio relay officer. He entered the Corps in 1936 and attended Marine radio schools at Parris Island and Quantico, and Army, Navy, and Air Forces communications schools. On Okinawa, he was awarded the Bronze Star while serving as III Amphib Corps radio relay officer. Capt Jeffcoat is now in charge of Radio Repairman's Course at MCRD, San Diego. (In the photograph on page 57, he is the officer talking on the telephone.)

LtCol Harry W. Edwards was prompted to write *Danger! Mines*, page 38, while serving as CO of the 3d Bn, 7th Marines in Korea. He has had a varied career in the Corps, including action with the 3d Marines on Samoa, Bougainville, Guadalcanal, and New Zealand, and as CO of the Marine detachment at the American Embassy in London in 1944-46. Col Edwards, a native of Minneapolis, holds the Navy Unit Citation and the various combat theater medals. He is a graduate of the University of Minnesota and the Senior Course.

The author of *Nobody Wants to Be a Fighting Man*, page 34, knows whereof he speaks. 1stLt Lawrence V. Ryan currently is a teacher of English composition at St. Thomas' College, St. Paul, Minnesota, and rubs elbows daily with the generation now coming into the Armed Forces. Lt Ryan was commissioned in October 1944, and was a platoon leader on Iwo Jima with the 21st Marines until wounded in the chest. He holds two Purple Heart awards, the Good Conduct Medal, Presidential Unit Citation, and Navy Unit Citation ribbons. He obtained a master's degree from Northwestern University in 1946.

the strange story of the CDL TANK



By MajGen J. F. C. Fuller

THE CDL TANK, MENTIONED BY LTCOL FREDERICK S. Aldridge in his interesting article *Let's Turn Night Into Day* which appeared in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE of April 1951, has a strange story to tell.

The idea behind it was the use of light, not only to enable an attacker to see clearly at night time, but simultaneously to dazzle and by temporarily blinding the defender to prevent him seeing the attacker. The means proposed was to fit a specially designed, armoured searchlight to a tank.

Historically, the inventors had not much to work on; yet the little they had supported their idea.

It would appear that in war searchlights were first used in 1863 at the siege of Fort Wagner, but with what success I am unaware. Next, in 1894, comes a strange item. Apparently, small searchlights or flashlights were being used for advertising, and as they dazzled the horses in the London streets, in the London Building Act of that year we read: "No person should exhibit any searchlight so as to be visible from any street, and cause danger to traffic therein. . . . . The expression 'searchlight' means and includes any light exceeding 500-candlepower." More cogent, in 1898 Adm Sampson, by switching a searchlight onto the narrow mouth of Santiago Harbour, stopped Cervera's fleet from escaping by night. More interesting, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Ashmead-Bartlett, a British war correspondent, writes: "I have been told by survivors that it [the searchlight] blots out everything in front, causing the men to wander aimlessly about seeking shelter from this terrible enemy; but all their efforts are in vain, for the rays follow their every moment, and the machine-gun follows the rays." Lastly, in the British attempt to force the Gallipoli Narrows in 1915, searchlights were employed to blind the Turkish gunners.

In August 1918, when the decisive battle of Amiens was approaching its end, I was transferred from France to the War Office to assist in doubling the Tank Corps. There I was at work one September morning when a stranger was announced. His name was Comdr

Baron de Thoren. He was a tall, gaunt man, in appearance much like a skeleton wrapped in parchment. (Later, I learned that he had held a commission in the Royal Navy, was by descent a Belgian, and that he possessed—or at least was alleged to possess—a castle in the Pyrenees. All of which appropriately fitted into the following strange story.)

Once seated, he said, "I have an invention which will revolutionize war as fully as Watt's steam engine revolutionized industry." Then he added, "It is the use of light as a weapon."

Pausing for a moment, he continued: "When motoring by night in a small car with side lights on, what happens when a Rolls Royce comes along with headlights blazing? You are dazzled, blinded, you pull up; but the driver of the Rolls can see you as clearly as in daytime. Transfer this picture to war: one side blinded and the other all-seeing. Isn't that a revolution?"

I agreed that it was, for instantaneously I saw in my mind an extraordinary and completely novel type of battle—a Basilisk fighting a blind worm. Light turned into both an invisible shield and a flaming sword. Night fighting, the one thing every general had shrunk from, becoming the commonplace. Indeed a revolution, and what a surprise to start a war on.

De Thoren then told me that the idea had flashed upon him in 1915; that he had communicated it to the War Office; that, in 1916, one tank fitted with a small searchlight had been experimented with. Other tests followed in August 1917, and, a year later, £20,000 had been allotted to carry out further trials.

At once I took up the project, but in November came the Armistice, and though in May 1922, further trials were carried out, according to De Thoren, their object was to damn his idea rather than to prove its worth, for this was the judgment he received:

"The Army Council is of opinion that the adoption of your proposals for fitting searchlights to tanks would confer no practical military advantages commensurate with the effort involved, though the basic theory, which is by no means novel, is undoubtedly correct."

Thus ends Chapter I.

For me at least, Chapter II opened in March 1932. Early that month I received a letter from a Col Reynolds mentioning the De Thoren project and asking me to meet him. On the 7th I did so in London at the Bath Club, and there he told me that for 10 years De Thoren had been trying to get people to finance his idea, and that, in July 1931, he had received War Office permission to disclose his project to the French Government. On account of this, a small syndicate had been formed to negotiate with France. Its manager was Mr M. Mitzakis. Would I become its adviser on tactics? This offer I accepted.

Shortly after I met Mitzakis. He was deeply interested in the project. He told me that De Thoren had nothing beyond the idea—no plans, no drawings, and not a bean. To raise money was, therefore, essential. Yet there was nothing to raise it on, not even a tactical picture of what could be accomplished with light as a weapon.

So I set to work and wrote a 12,000-word pamphlet entitled *The Attack by Illumination.* In it all phases of war were touched upon. This became our confidential prospectus.

As the French were pressing for information and we had as yet nothing to show them, in October 1933, Mitzakis and I went over to Paris. We outlined our difficulties and were told, if we could produce the apparatus, they were willing to test it out. This was reasonable.

At length, having raised some £2,000, early in 1934 we set to work and during that year carried out two night trials in Richmond Park with a projector of 85,000,000 candlepower. The first trial was a fiasco, the second gave us great hope. Thus ends Chapter II.

Expenses mounting, money once again became the crucial problem. Of a sudden, it was solved. De Thoren approached the Duke of Westminster, and the Duke, seeing the military value of his idea, forthwith agreed to finance the project. All he regretted was that it was going to France.

At once we pushed on with the work, informing the French Ministry of War that we should be ready to test the apparatus at the end of the year. Finally, the date was fixed for the middle of December, the place being the Camp of Châlons.

As a demonstration of what light could do, these trials were a success, but as a tactical test they were a failure, for the Renault tanks used were worn-out old 1917 machines. Therefore it was decided to hold further trials with more modern machines. Meanwhile we agreed to improve the apparatus.

The trials having convinced me that the French were hopeless to work with, and never having liked the invention going to France, I decided to approach the War Office, and in April 1935, I wrote the Master-General of the Ordnance. His reply was not very encouraging. It was:

"The last time we examined De Thoren we came to the conclusion we should have to build a special series of machines in order to carry the apparatus, and that, as a matter of practical policy in peace, is completely out of the question."

Therefore, all we could do was to continue work with the French.

In May 1936, the next trials took place at Châlons,

and were an unqualified success. Fortunately, we had persuaded our Paris military attaché and a War Office representative to attend them. Their report was so favorable that the War Office agreed to re-open the question and hold similar trials in England.

This closes Chapter III.

From now onward we decided to go slow with France and show them no more of our patents, which were multiplying. Work was pushed on and, at the end of the year, when all was ready for the English trials, I rewrote my *Attack by Illumination* and posted copies direct to the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The trials took place on January 28, 1937, but unfortunately a cold prevented the C.I.G.S. attending. The tanks worked perfectly and the lights, now advanced to 154,000,000 candlepower, were absolutely blinding.

Thereupon we determined to knock off with the French; yet for some unknown reason the War Office was not overpleased at this. We were informed that their understanding with France was better than it had been for years.

Between June 1937, and January 1938, further trials were carried out, and I wrote to the new C.I.G.S., with no results. Nevertheless, on January 24, we were informed that Messrs Vickers had been instructed to design and build a special tank turret to accommodate our projector. Later we were told that it would be ready by June 1939. So ends Chapter IV.

NOW CAME ANOTHER surprise. This is what I read in the London *John Bull* of May 13, 1939:

"Motorised units fitted with searchlights of blinding intensity are the German Army's newest weapon. General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command, claims that soon his experts will be able to project dazzling beams of light to prevent enemies taking proper aim at advancing troops."

It certainly looked as if the secret were out. If so, then the only thing to do was to push on at top speed, in order to be in a position to meet like by like.

The outstanding difficulty was that there was no single man in charge of the invention at the War Office. Thus, on May 24, Col T. wrote to me: "So many changes have taken place in the Department that no one remains who actually knows anything about the thing. . . . Why the hell cannot they make proper use of your brains and knowledge?"

As war was obviously approaching, on May 30 I wrote a long letter to the D.C.I.G.S. I said in part:

"The situation we have arrived at is nothing short of criminal. Here we are living on the brink of war, in possession of an invention which enables us to turn night into day for ourselves and simultaneously doubles all the difficulties of night in either attack or defence for our enemy. Yet for three years all the W.O. has done is to potter about with it. . . .

"Should this report [*John Bull* extract] be correct, Heaven help us if one day we are surprised by our own invention. The sole way of defeating it is by superior intensity of light, and we shall look like pretty fools, seeing that off and on the W.O. has been considering this invention for 22 years and has after all these years given birth to one machine. What a headline!"

The reply I received was not encouraging: "Unfortunately we are not, at present, in a position to earmark large numbers of tanks for a special purpose. . ."

This showed that the D.C.I.G.S. had missed the whole point; for it was for a tactical revolution and not a special purpose that we had been working.

Therefore I wrote again:

"Another point which does not seem to have been grasped is that our idea is not to produce a machine for a special purpose; but instead to render daylight attacks the *exception* and night attacks *the rule*. In short, to revolutionize tactics.

"For instance, were it possible in broad daylight by an act of magic for Army A temporarily to blind Army B, what chance would B have when attacked by A? By this invention such a condition can be created not during daytime, but during night-time. Therefore, we maintain that night attacks will become normal operations of war and cease to be *special* ones.

"I have spent seven years studying this question from every angle, and all I can say is that I am as certain of its success as in 1917 I was certain that should a *large number* of tanks be launched over unshelled ground, the Hindenburg Line could be broken. Cambrai justified that certainly; yet that battle was a failure because the Higher Command looked upon the tank attack as a stunt."

I received a two line acknowledgement—that was all.

It was no good pressing the War Office further, for

Grant tank converted for CDL use



British Information Service

in July the invention was taken over by the Ministry of Supply. So we had to start all over again.

Such was our position when, on September 1, Germany invaded Poland. Thus ends Chapter V.

In early October further trials were held, which I did not attend. What they were for I can't imagine, for as Mitzakis wrote to me: "My only comment is that it is appalling that we have been wasting two years to lead up to a half hour's show, which could have been demonstrated with a pencil and paper in an hour."

So once again I sat down and wrote to the new C.I.G.S. —the third I communicated with. I concluded my letter as follows:

"I do earnestly urge that this method of attack be at once prepared for, because in the war conditions which now face us, tactical surprise, more so than weight of metal, is likely to lead to success."

This time something did happen: so far as the War Office were now concerned, a permanent officer was placed in charge of the invention.

At length Vickers—five months late—finished the model turret. Whereupon, in December, the War Office were enthusiastic enough to order six further sets in order to carry out yet more trials!

In April 1940 these turrets were ready, and we were notified that they would be tried out at Lydd on May 10.

THE 10TH WAS A LOVELY MORNING, and at Charing Cross Station I bought a copy of *The Star* and read—"NAZIS INVADE HOLLAND AND BELGIUM."

On meeting Mitzakis at The Ship Hotel, Dymchurch, I said: "Not a very good day for the trials."

"Why," he replied, "it is beautiful weather." Then I handed him *The Star* and said: "Read this. As sure as I am standing here the War Office will cancel the trials." So they did. At lunch, by telephone we were informed that, on account of the invasion, all was off.

On the 21st we were informed that the postponed trials would take place at Lulworth, Hampshire, on June 7, and on the 5th of that month I received a telegram from Mitzakis confirming this. I still have it, and I find that at the time I scribbled on the back of it Drake's famous words, written to Queen Elizabeth shortly before the sailing of the Armada:

"The advantage of time and place in all martial action is half of victory; which being lost is irrecoverable."

On the 7th the trials were held, and under the most drastic conditions. Two Maltida tanks carrying turrets and lights were to stand still while two Valentine tanks were to advance on them and attempt to extinguish their lights by shell and machine gun fire. The range was about half a mile.

Sunddenly 300,000,000 candlepowers burst on the spectators, forcing down the heads of all who were unprovided with slabs of red glass to look through.

The Valentines moved forward and opened fire. Shell after shell plunged into the blinding glare. Next the rattle of machine guns added to the din. The advance was continued until the Valentines were within twenty yards of their quarry. The cease fire then sounded.

When the Matildas were examined, it was found that one of them had been hit on its frontal armour by two shells, but that they had not penetrated. Also one of the reflectors had been slightly damaged by a bullet or shell fragment, the light being reduced by about 10 per cent.

Considering that the Maltidas were standing still and not firing, and that the lights remained unextinguished, the victory was ours.

Turning to one of the War Office representatives I said. "I hope you are convinced. All you have now to do is to take the light and a gun and build a proper machine round them."

He seemed a little perplexed. "And the gun?" he queried. "Oh! we are not going to have any bother about a gun. In any case, we can't get it in, as we are going to put turrets onto Valentine machines."

"Onto Valentines?" I answered. "Why they are already obsolete, and without a gun what will the crew have to fight with?"

"Well," he replied, "we have a lot of Valentines on order, and the tankmen don't much like them. As to fighting, other machines will have to do that."

I argued no further; what was the use? But to send a new and surprising machine into action without a weapon to fight with seemed to me to be idiotic.

Ten days later, on June 17, was the day Marshall Pétain hoisted the white flag, and after 25 years' consideration, the War Office decided to use the invention. Production was to start at once, and 250 turrets for the Valentines were to be built and delivered in May 1941.

Thus, for myself, at least, the story ends; for though I had spent years in considering the tactics of attack by illumination, from that day to the end of the war not a word did I hear on what was done, nor was I asked a

single question.

This part is hearsay, for its contents are based on the information of those who were concerned with CDLs from July 1940 to the end of the war.

Shortly after the final trials at Lulworth, the War Office decided to create a CDL school, and the first came into being on December 1, 1940, its establishment eventually rising to 33 officers and 619 other ranks. In August, 1942, a second school was formed in the Middle East, and later on another in the United States.

Approximately 6,000 officers and men passed through the English schools and 8,000 through the American. In all, some 1,850 tanks were converted to CDL use in England, and two English CDL brigades were raised, the 1st Tank Brigade (three battalions) and the 35th Tank Brigade (two battalions). In America two armoured groups were formed, the 9th and 10th, each comprising three battalions.

Though prior to D-Day (June 6, 1944) the 1st Tank Brigade and the 10th Armoured Group were fully mobilized and ready to proceed overseas, so little interest was taken in the new weapon that it was not until August 11 that the first of these formations was landed in France, the second following 11 days later.

Even then, instead of being used in the operations following on the break-through of the US Third Army at Avranches, operations in which the Germans could seldom move except under cover of night,* the six battalions were never moved forward from their disembarkation camps and were gradually disbanded.

On September 20, the US 9th Armoured Group, when on the point of leaving England for France, was broken up. On October 13, the 1st Tank Brigade suffered a similar fate, its men being drafted to other units and its tanks stripped of their CDL equipment. On October 27, orders were given to disband the American 10th Armoured Group, but owing to protests made by its command, these orders were only partially carried out. In the meantime the 35th Tank Brigade had been disbanded in England.

NO SOONER HAD THESE STEPS been taken than Lord Louis Mountbatten requested that at least a brigade of CDLs be dispatched as soon as possible to India. As there was none now available, the War Office decided to re-equip 360 CDLs for S.E.A.C. and re-train new personnel At the time, it was also decided to re-equip a CDL battalion for the invasion of Germany. The men needed for these units were taken from the personnel of the CDL School and such trained men of the 35th Tank Brigade still available.

Unfortunately, there was insufficient time in which to train an entire CDL battalion for Germany; but two squadrons of 14 CDLs each were hurriedly got together and on February 20, 1945, left for France to be attached to the 21st Army Group. On March 1, 1945, the first complement of CDLs left for India, to be followed by the balance required as soon as the training of officers and men had been completed.

Seemingly, because the 28 CDLs dispatched to France were insufficient for any major offensive operation, eventually they were used in a purely static role—for which they were not intended—to cover with their lights the crossing of the Rhine. As regards the CDLs dispatched to Mountbatten, they arrived too late to take part in the final operations in Burma.

Thus ends this miserable story of endless delays covering in all 30 years; of acceptance, of vast preparations costing many millions of pounds, of disbandment, of resurrection and final misuse or no use at all. Yet strangest of all is it that the higher command could not see that in the CDL they had a weapon which, because it could carry out the "blitz attack" at night-time under conditions far more favourable to the attacker than could possibly be found in daylight, the pulverization of towns and cities and the vast preliminary artillery and air bombardments had largely become unnecessary.

Total war demands total movement—that is, movement round-the-clock. Once armies went into winter quarters and cut down their operational year by six months. Still, armies go into night quarters and cut down their operational day by 12 hours. When are soldiers going to tumble to it that an army which can fight round-the-clock has a hundred per cent advantage over one which can only fight half way round it, because it has twice the operational time at its disposal? USMC

*The following supports this contention. North of the Falaise pocket were the 272d, 346th, and 711th German Inf Divs, which, on account of the rout to the south of them, were compelled to fall back. Of their retreat, Gen Diestel, commander of the 346th, has since said: "As soon as we were safely lodged behind a river, we would find that our left had disintegrated and that we were in danger of being encircled. We would then move back again. We never hurried in these movements because of the systematic and thoroughly organized tactics of the Allies [Twenty-First Army Group]. When we had been thrown back during the day, we always knew that there would be a pause at night when the enemy would regroup for the next day's operations. It was these hours of darkness that enabled us to retire without suffering many casualties."

Twice as much fighting time

British Information Service



Why build a bunker?

By 1stLt Henry J. Witkowski

A MARINE IN COMBAT DESERVES A FIGHTING CHANCE. That ought to be obvious, but when it comes to building bunkers, I'm just about convinced we're encouraging Marines to dig their own graves. So I raise the question in all seriousness: Why build a bunker?

We may get part of the answer from the fatal experiences of our enemies in Korea and WW II. In the last war the Japanese used bunkers extensively, with no great success. The Maginot Line, probably the best fortified position ever built, was easily breached. In Korea, the enemy has made great use of the bunker and yet has failed to deny us any position we wanted to take. In at least one instance I know of, UN forces used bunkers and their positions were overrun, too. In talking to the troops that do the actual fighting and the officers that lead these troops, I found, without exception, they prefer fighting out in the open. Evidently then, the bunker isn't what it's built up to be.

THE QUESTION FIRST ENTERED my mind when I examined a number of bunkers on a position that had recently been overrun. Visibility from the bunkers was very poor. There were no communications between positions and most surprising of all, many of the positions had absolutely no fields of fire. In many instances it was impossible to see the ground immediately to the front of the firing port. All of us were of the opinion that the catastrophe would never have occurred had the positions been properly constructed.

Some time later we were called to build emplacements of our own. As a platoon leader, I picked out positions and after giving what I considered careful instructions, the men went to work. As the positions were completed I checked them, and much to my surprise they were as bad, if not worse, then the positions previously mentioned. The light machine guns attached to my platoon, as well as a section of heavy machine guns from Weapons Co, in some cases could not fire down the slope directly to their front. BAR and rifle positions were found to be as bad or worse. In fact, they were worse than no positions at all. Not wanting to admit I had doped off, I started checking the positions in other platoon sectors and found, almost without fail, that all had the same faults. Those that had good visibility and fields of fire were built with such large ports they could be spotted from miles away. Here were supposedly well-trained troops, who had spent five or six months in combat, building what amounted to their own graves. Since then I have checked bunkers whenever possible and have found without exception that we have subtracted from the effectiveness of our emplacements simply by adding a cover.

LET'S EXAMINE SOME OF THESE bunkers and see how they were built. In all cases they were on steep slopes. A hole large enough to accommodate two people sleeping was dug straight into the ground from one to three feet in front and up to six feet in back, due to the slope of the ground. The dirt from these holes frequently was thrown to the front of the position, which only helped make the position more difficult to camouflage and almost impossible to see out of. Sandbags, two or three high, were set at the forward corners of the hole and a log was set across them. The cover was constructed by running logs from the rear of the position onto this front support log and then covering the logs with dirt. It was impossible to raise your head in most of these bunkers far enough to be able to see down the slope directly to the front of the position. Machine guns were in much the same predicament for they could not be depressed enough to fire down the slope. We can argue that the solution to the whole problem is simply to raise the cover until you have good visibility and can fire effec-

tively. However, the opening gets proportionately larger as the slope of the ground increases, making the position very difficult to camouflage. It is my opinion that once a position is spotted, it's as good as knocked out. It can be neutralized by small arms fire and secured with any of the weapons available to the enemy, including artillery, air, mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles, grenades, and flamethrowers.

If the bunker is so ineffective, why must the infantryman build one? The main reason, I believe, is to give him protection from flying shrapnel, for certainly there are few bunkers that would stand up under a direct hit from any kind of artillery. If that is the case, let's use the bunker for shrapnel protection and that reason only. Let's give the fighting man the chance to use his most effective close range weapon—the hand grenade. Let's give him the psychological advantage of seeing the man in the hole next to his, of not feeling alone and cooped up. In other words let's get him out of the bunker and into a hole he can fight from; into a hole from which he can see and fire 360 degrees, use his hands and weapon freely, make use of his grenades and even his bayonet. Let's let him fight in a hole of his own choosing—the fox hole or spider hole.

It is my contention that the most effective type of emplacement is the spider hole. It's easy to construct. It affords all around visibility and fields of fire, and with the exception of being vulnerable to an air burst it's as safe a position as can be built in combat. For automatic weapons, two such holes close together afford the best cover and at the same time give the best fields of fire. Time permitting, the best emplacement would be a combination bunker (for shrapnel protection only) and the spider hole (from which to fight).

This type of emplacement would give the desired protection during bombing or shelling and at the same time give the infantrymen the advantage of fighting from a spider hole. In building any type of position, it is strongly suggested that all dirt be either carried away from the position or scattered so that it will not be noticed. Building a parapet only makes the position more difficult to camouflage and cuts down on observation and fields of fire. The head and shoulders of a man must, of necessity, be exposed for firing. Building a parapet only makes him expose himself all the more.

A poor bunker could be your own grave

I do not wish to disqualify the bunker completely as a fighting position. On relatively flat ground I believe it has a great many advantages that cannot be overlooked. Before building one on the side of a mountain, however, first weigh carefully all the advantages and disadvantages. Then if you still think it's a good idea, why go ahead and build one. As for me—I'll do all my fighting in the open.

USMC



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

Another idea from Korea



I. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

Two recent surprises in China have shaken the political prophets about as badly as anything could. The first was when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, the hero of China's struggle and one of the "big four" commanding the largest and best equipped army China had ever had, with complete air and sea supremacy, was driven out of the whole of China by Mao Tze-Tung and his Communists in less than 12 months. That was a complete surprise even to the Kremlin who, however much they may have approved of Mao, had long been doing business with Chiang as the man in possession. The second was when the Chinese Communist Armies, which had stood by unmoved while the United Nations troops were hard pressed at Pusan, poured in to rescue the defeated North Koreans near the Yalu River. "The Chinese never reinforced a failure," the prophets had said; "if they didn't come in when the going looked good, they won't stick their necks out now." They could not have been more wrong.

If there is a clue to these two mysteries, it lies in the nature of the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese Revolution has been going on a good deal longer than the Russian, by Chinese reckoning since 10 October 1911. Mao Tze-Tung himself has said that it will go on for a long time yet and be divided into two phases—what he calls "the New Democratic Revolution" which is almost complete, and the "Socialist Revolution" with which he proposes to follow it. Western observers are more inclined to think of it as a Chinese revolution which has been temporarily mixed up with a Communist one. Whether the two can or will be disentangled is the most important question in China today, but it seems certain that most of the difficulties in foretelling the course of events in China arise because we are never sure which revolution is supplying the real motive.

The Chinese Reds believe they are carrying on the fight for a "people's government" started by Sun Yat-Sen

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS



By A. D. C. Peterson

The guiding spirit of the Chinese Revolution in its early days was Sun Yat-Sen. His "three principles" are still revered both by Communists and their opponents. They have been translated as "the people's government, the people's livelihood, and the people's nationalism." Since it was the traditional Manchu aristocracy who stood in the way of the people's government, the first principle means that the Chinese Revolution is anti-traditional; since it was generally accepted that the landlord stood in the way of the peasants' livelihood (80-90% of the "people" are peasants) the Revolution is anti-landlord; since it was the Western powers who at that time stood in the way of Chinese sovereignty, the Revolution is anti-western. Revolutions are always revolutions *against* something, and in picking what to be against Sun Yat-Sen showed shrewd judgement. The inefficient Manchu government was swept away almost unnoticed, but in attacking conservatism and the traditional way of life as a whole, he sided with the "modernising" movement which, for good or ill, is today sweeping all Asia before it. In attacking the problem of present poverty and landlordism he was again siding with a just and insistent demand, strong all over Asia and strongest perhaps in China. Finally, he could rally every Chinese behind his nationalism and his attack on the "colonial" powers. As Prime Minister Nehru of India has said, "No argument in any country of Asia is going to have weight if it goes counter to the nationalist spirit of the country, Communism or no Communism." The determination of the Chinese to free their country from any vestige of foreign control is probably the strongest of all the motives inspiring the Revolution.

II. COMMUNIST PARTNERSHIP IN THE REVOLUTION 1924-27.

In 1924, Sun Yat-Sen, then leading the revolutionary Chinese government in Canton, made a secret agreement with the Soviet Ambassador, by which the Chinese Communist Party was to be accepted as a partner in the Revolution. This Communist Party was not very old and not, at that time, very strong. It had been founded in 1921 at a meeting in Shanghai at which Mao Tze-Tung was present, but many of the leaders were then in exile and joined branches of the Chinese Communist Party in Europe. Thus Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of all Chinese Communist Forces since 1931, joined the Berlin branch and was not expelled from Germany until 1925. Chu Teh was first an old Republican conspirator along with Sun Yat-Sen, then from 1916-22 a typical "warlord." In 1922 he gave up all this and went to study in Europe, where he joined the Communist Party. A soldier first and foremost, he led the Communist Party against Chiang Kai-Shek in 1927 and the famous "Long March" in 1934.

Chou En-Lai, the present Foreign Minister of Communist China, was another exile member. He had gone to France in 1920 at Mao's suggestion, and in 1921 helped to found a Paris branch, whence he returned via Germany to China in 1924. He is perhaps the least anti-western of the Communist leaders. Another member of the French branch was Li Li-San, the only leader of industrial workers in the Chinese Communist Party, who had also gone to France on Mao's suggestion.

The one important member of the party high command who until 1949 had never been out of China—not even to Moscow—is Mao Tze-Tung himself.

The agreement between Sun Yat-Sen and the Kremlin meant that these Communist leaders were instructed to cooperate with Sun's party, the Kuo Min Tang, or Nationalists. The decision was not a Chinese one, but taken by the Politburo in Russia, and Trotsky's opposition to it was a main factor in the great debate between him and Stalin which ended in Trotsky's downfall and assassination. Judging from the fate of other

"left wing" parties which have agreed to collaborate with the Communists, the Russians probably intended that the Communists should ultimately "infiltrate" the government, and then betray and liquidate their partners. To organise this they sent to Sun Yat-Sen's headquarters a Russian representative, Borodin, who was for some time perhaps the most powerful man in China. They were thwarted in their design by the vigorous young general who then commanded Sun Yat-Sen's armies—Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang had been to Moscow himself to negotiate for Russian help and learn revolutionary methods from the Russians; and though he did not become a Communist he was very impressed by what he saw. He may also have got a hint of what he might be up against. At any rate he took very good care that, though the Communists were accepted as partners, they were not allowed to "infiltrate" too far.

Though Sun Yat-Sen clearly saw the dangers of associating with the Communists, the partnership had great attractions for him. He had been deeply disappointed by the attitude of the Western Powers at the end of the 1914-18 war and was now bitterly anti-Western: in such a mood Russia seemed the only possible ally. Moreover his main purpose at the moment was to unify China and destroy the rival Chinese Government in Pekin, which Russia, for her own reasons, was equally anxious to overthrow.

With the return of the leaders from exile and the opportunity to collaborate in the national movement, the Chinese Communists rapidly gained thousands of new supporters. They did this chiefly because they were prepared to be much more ruthless in applying Sun Yat-Sen's "principles" than his own more constitutional Nationalist party. Mao himself has expressed this view in his usual rugged way: "Revolution cannot be carried out without crushing all kinds of pretty decorations; it cannot be carried out softly, gradually, carefully, considerately, respectfully, and appeasingly." The Communists, for instance, gained great mass support through the violence of their anti-foreign action, particularly in the anti-British strikes organised in 1925 and 1926. They also began their long process of winning over the peasantry by advocating, and carrying out, wherever they were in power, the confiscation and redistribution of land.

III. THE SPLIT BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

By 1927, with the advance northward to Nanking and the surrender—organised by Communists—of Shanghai, the uneasy partnership was brought to an end. But this time it was not the Communists who struck first but their rivals; this time it was the Communist leaders who suddenly found themselves put under arrest and subsequently beheaded by Chiang Kai-Shek. Mao Tze-Tung was one of those who escaped. It was inevitable that a split of this kind would happen sooner or later, but Chiang probably chose his moment for two reasons: because the violence of the Communists' anti-foreign action, though popular enough with Chinese, appeared to be leading to joint intervention against the partnership by Britain, France, and the United States; and because the

nearer the victorious Nationalists got to North China the more their interests diverged from Russia's. Both were anxious to overthrow the Chinese government in Pekin, but Chiang may have suspected—and suspected rightly—that there was not quite so much agreement about who should replace it.

For a short time the Communists tried to run a rival government in China, but the feeling of the country was against them and their attempt soon failed: Stalin, unable to admit in the middle of his controversy that Trotsky had been right, called for more and more violent action to save a situation that was already lost: and finally Borodin had to leave the country, while the remaining Communists were driven "underground" or into the hills. With Borodin went a young man, then serving on his staff, of whom a good deal is heard today—Ho Chih-Minh, the leader of the Communist Party in Indo-China.

AFTER THE COLLAPSE, the Chinese Communist leaders wanted to withdraw their forces to the Northwest where they would be near Russia, and Mao, particularly, continued to insist that the first thing was to win over the peasants. The Politburo in Moscow thought otherwise. Although China is an almost purely peasant country, they argued, on doctrinaire grounds, that the revolution must be based on the industrial proletariat, and that direct action must be taken in the big cities. At their insistence Professor Chen Tu-Hsiu, the leader of the Chinese Communist party, was "purged," just as a few months earlier Mao himself had been dropped from the central committee for disagreeing with Borodin.

Li Li-San, the former president of the Mine-workers Union, tried to put into operation the official policy, but it failed hopelessly, first in the bloody and useless rising known as the "Canton Commune", which Stalin himself had ordered, and then in Li Li-San's own attempt to capture and hold the large city of Chang-Sha in 1930. As a penalty for this failure he was himself denounced for Trotskyist diversionism and recalled to Russia. It is worth noting that although the Kremlin recalled Borodin and Li Li-San, neither were liquidated. Li Li-San actually returned to China with the Russian armies in 1945 and is now Minister of Labor in the Chinese Communist Government, where there have been rumors of fresh disagreements between him and Mao Tze-Tung.

After these failures, the only successful Communist movements remaining in China were the peasant Soviets organised by Mao and Chu Teh in the Southern provinces of Kiangsi and Kwantung. They, on their side, were still enthusiastic imitators of everything Russian and gradually the Kremlin had to admit that their line of concentrating on the peasants was right. Even so, it was Moscow-trained Chen Shao-Yui (Wang Ming) whom the Kremlin tried to build up as China's Communist leader, rather than the more independent and "Chinese" Mao Tze-Tung. It is usually suggested that Mao enjoys the confidence of the Kremlin because he has always toed the party line. In this case, at least, it seems possible that the party line may have followed Mao, and that if Li Li-San had been successful he would have been acclaimed as the true leader and Mao relegated to obscurity or worse for his "incorrect" concentration on the peasants.

IV. THE "LONG MARCH" AND EXILE IN YENAN 1934-45.

The Communist soviets in the hills of Kiangsi were constantly blockaded, attacked, and finally bombed by the government troops under Chiang Kai-Shek, until their position became impossible. In 1934 they decided on a desperate step—a break out from Kiangsi and an attempt to set up a new Communist area on the extreme frontier of China, where they would be in touch with Russia, could not be surrounded, and would be almost out of reach of government troops. This was the very plan which the Comintern had vetoed in 1928. They broke out in two parties, amounting to as many as 40,000 well-disciplined troops, and after an epic journey lasting nearly two years settled in the Northwest at Yenan. It was Chu Teh's first great triumph as an army commander.

Why was it possible for Chiang Kai-Shek, with far less resources than in 1946, to drive the Communists virtually out of China? And why, when he had them on the run, did he let them get away? The answer to the first question is also the clue to his later defeat. In 1934 the Chinese still looked to Chiang Kai-Shek to complete Sun Yat-Sen's revolution: they looked to him to unify the country, drive out the foreigners, sweep away the old abuses, and give the land to the peasants. He had promised to do all these things, and the Communists were an obstacle in his path which prevented him doing them. Apart from this, the Communists had made two big mistakes. Borodin's Russian mission had given many Chinese the idea that Communism was itself another sort of control by foreigners and therefore contrary to their own revolution. The Russians never made that

LEFT: Victorious Chinese Communists enter Canton hard on the heels of retreating Nationalists who were given permission to withdraw without a fight

mistake again, and since 1927 their influence on Chinese Communist policy has always been exerted through the Chinese Communist leaders themselves, never by direct help or intervention. Secondly, the Communists had gone too fast in Canton and Kiangsi so that they antagonised anyone who had any land or property at all. Again Mao has taken great care since to make it clear that the little man will not be touched and that even the big landlord will be left a certain amount of property.

As to their getting away, Chiang Kai-Shek may genuinely have been unable to stop them, but it is against all the traditions of Chinese warfare to hurry a retreating enemy if he is still dangerous and capable of putting up a fight. They think it safer to let him go, because it is almost equally untraditional for an army that has once begun to retreat to halt and move over to the offensive. To be defeated and start retreating shows that Heaven is against you, and in that case the traditional thing to do is to submit gracefully. There were plenty instances of this failure to harass a retreating enemy in the Chinese advance from the Yalu River.

During the "Long March" Mao was elected to the Comintern, but he did not go to Russia to receive the honor, and he had to share it with Wang Ming who had returned to Moscow in 1931.

Yenan, the new home of the Communists in the Northwest, was a purely peasant district and Mao began here with the policies which have given him such a hold over the northern Chinese peasantry—and indeed almost all Chinese—ever since. The first, on which all accounts agree, was the simplicity and honesty of his government. He himself popularised the simple cloth cap which all government officials have copied and, from himself downwards, he insisted that no soldier and no official should enrich himself at the expense of the peasantry. Bribery and looting, which had been the curse of China for years, were really stamped out, and in the Communist armies the officers really did march and live with their men. The effect of this has been incalculable. It is one of the most deep-seated of all Chinese beliefs that the good ruler must govern by setting a good example to his people, and as the news of this example

LEFT: General Chu Teh addresses men of his CCF Eighth Route Army. BELOW: Red Premier Chou En Lai and wife at a reception. RIGHT: Communist Chief Mao Tze-Tung at a staff conference with General Chu Teh



Sun Yat-Sen, the great founder of the Republic of China

began to filter out from Yenan, the Chinese people began to wonder if Mao might be the real savior of China. Thus Mao looked like fulfilling the first of Sun Yat-Sen's three principles. Soon it became clear that he meant to fulfill the second, too, for the land really was taken away from landlords and distributed to peasants, though they found they had to pay almost as much in taxes as they used to pay in rent. Finally, Mao seemed clear of any connection with "foreigners" and when Japan attacked in 1937 he tried hard to give the impression that he, and not Chiang Kai-Shek, could be trusted to fight to the last ditch.

Russia, at this time, was concerned with one thing only —the Japanese threat to her own Far Eastern possessions. The Politburo decided that Chiang was the only man who could unite China to resist the Japanese, and so they instructed Mao to form a common anti-Japanese front with him. Mao would have had to fight the Japanese, anyhow, if he wanted to retain any support in China. So began the very uneasy partnership which went on all through the war. As soon as Pearl Harbor made it clear to the far-sighted that Japanese defeat was inevitable, both Nationalists and Communists began to prepare for a post-war showdown. When the Communists tried to take over a sector of China from which the Central government had banned them, there was actually fighting between the two parties while the Japanese stood by and watched. It looked as if this situation must play into Chiang's hands. All the war supplies, even what little came from Russia, were sent to him, and not only did he pass none on to the Communists, but he stored up his own for post-war use. At the end of the war he was recognised by all the great powers, including Russia, as the ruler of all China. His army contained a number of veteran divisions trained and equipped on a western scale during the war, and the whole Chinese Air Force and Navy were under his control. Against this the Communists could set two advantages only. First, they had been more active than the Nationalists in guerilla warfare and controlled "liberated areas" near the great towns of North China and the Yangtse valley. Second, their friends, the Russians, had marched into Manchuria, which had been the Japanese arsenal.

For two years after the war constant attempts were made, with American help, to bring the two sides together and avoid a civil war. It is hardly worth arguing whether Nationalists or Communists were most to blame for the failure. When each side strongly suspected that the other would betray the partnership as soon as possible, it is hardly surprising that no agreement was reached. The Russians, true to their policy of not burning their fingers in China a second time, stood by and waited for the war to start. When it did the Communists swept Chiang Kai-Shek out of China in less than 12 months.

V. COMMUNIST VICTORY

We come now to the answer to the first mystery. Why did Chiang lose the war just when everything looked as if he must win it? Most observers agree that the first cause was the collapse of the Nationalist regime rather than anything miraculous in the Communists. At first, China welcomed Chiang back with open arms, but it very soon found that since 1930 the Nationalist Party had gone rapidly down hill. Things that shocked all believers in Sun Yat-Sen's new China were the immense

Red Troops invaded and seized Hainan Island, one of the last held points off the China south coast

fortunes acquired by the Nationalist leaders—including particularly the "four families" who reappeared constantly as ministers in every government; the corruption which spread down through all Army and official life and ended with unpaid soldiers and equipment sold on the black market; and the persecution of any opposition, however moderate, which ended with the assassination of such beloved figures as the liberal professor Wen I-Tuo at the end of the war. Business circles were exasperated by the wild inflation of the currency, which ruined everyone else while those "in the know" made fortunes. (The national dollar finally reached a rate of 12 million to the U. S. dollar). The middle class saw the funds that should have been used for reconstruction wasted on luxuries—except where UNRRA fought a losing battle. The peasants realized that a government which now included the biggest capitalists and landlords in the country would never really drive out the landlord, and the Nationalists suspected that one which accepted so much American aid would never drive out the foreigner. If any one was to put Sun Yat-Sen's principles into practice it was clearly not going to be the Kuo Min-Tang.

The first serious consequence of this loss of faith was that the "intellectuals" and the "youth" went over to the Communists. In most countries this would not matter so much, but the "intellectual" is very important in China and the "youth", that is the university and high school students, was the core of the Chinese revolution. It has been said that by the end of the Nationalist regime every university in Nationalist China was in a state of siege. Certainly, arrests without trial and "beating up" of students had become almost normal.

This loss of support faced Chiang with a serious danger that his generals would also go over to the Communists taking their armies with them—as his Northwestern commander, Chih-Chung, who had defended Shanghai so gallantly against the Japanese, actually did. Largely as a result of this Chiang tried to control the whole war by a very inefficient signal system from his own headquarters; and this, against a swift moving opponent like Chu Teh, was fatal. Finally, when once the tide had turned in favor of the Communists, he announced that he still hoped to win the civil war after six years' fighting. The Chinese preferred the Communists who were quite sure they would win it in one. No one—no one at all wanted six years' civil war. China rejected Chiang because he himself had rejected the Chinese revolution, and because, like the Communists in 1827, he stood in the way of national unity.

Those who know Chiang Kai-Shek will believe that right up to the end he remained an honest and patriotic statesman. But his associates have been condemned on every side, and he listened too much to "yes-men". If Formosa is comparatively well governed now it is probably because the worst of the "old gang" have got out and taken their money with them.

Though the main cause of the Communist victory was probably the corruption and incompetence of the Na-

tionalist regime, the Communists armies themselves had a good deal to do with it. Ever since the "Long March" Chu Teh had shown himself a fine strategist, and by the time the clash with Chiang Kai-Shek came he had, by Chinese standards, a fine army to work with. It was, of course, an old fashioned army—with no air power, no armor, very little artillery, and no motor transport to speak of. On the other hand, the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldier favored him. The Chinese soldier fights doggedly in defence—almost as doggedly as the Japanese—provided he has confidence in his leaders: and the Nationalist troops had mostly lost that confidence. He fights well in attack, for a short period, and at not very frequent intervals, again provided he is well led. Chu Teh never had to subject his troops to the strain of long, costly or unsuccessful attacks, such as have badly shaken the Chinese troops in Korea, because the Nationalists folded up as soon as the strain began. Time and again defences were built round the cities, even across the city streets, and abandoned as soon as the attack began. The Nationalist air and artillery superiority was not perhaps as effective as might have been expected, because the Chinese are less susceptible than other Oriental troops, perhaps even than some Western troops, to the morale-shaking qualities of mere noise—and the Nationalists bombardments were often so ill aimed as to provide little more. Chu Teh's armies started fairly well equipped with small arms, including automatic weapons and light artillery, looted from captured Japanese dumps in Manchuria. The Russian occupying troops, although ostensibly still acting as "allies" of the Nationalist government, took good care that the contents of these dumps went to their real friends. As a campaign went on they were able to add to their equipment plenty of good American material, captured from—and in some cases sold by—the Nationalists. Although there is no evidence of Russian military advisers accompanying them, some experts detect signs of post-war Russian technique in Chu Teh's use of artillery, in which he was much more skillful than the Nationalists.

One great advantage of his armies was mobility in difficult country. The Nationalists controlled the main towns and lines of communication, but the Communists were able to move with great speed across country, "living on the land." This ability to do without supply and administrative services is of course a quality of all Chinese troops, but it is effective only if the countryside is reasonably friendly and the enemy irresolute. You cannot live on captured supply dumps if they are not surrendered, nor on "the land" unless you can move fast through comparatively friendly areas. The Communists could do both better than the Nationalists because of their infinitely better discipline.

VI. COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY.

The first reaction of Chinese cities and villages "liberated" by the Communists was curiosity, the second relief. Everyone wanted to see what these Communists were like: everyone was relieved to find that they neither looted nor destroyed property and actually addressed common civilians with common civility. Chinese soldiers had not been seen to do that for a long time. Many people were relieved, too, to find that there were virtually no reprisals or executions, and that people who had served the Nationalists were usually confirmed in their jobs or at worst left alone. All this had its good side, but it was, of course, also part of Mao's policy of doing things gradually and conserving China's most rare and valuable asset—administrative experience and ability. The country is so desperately short of skilled men of all kinds that the Communists were bound to try to "convert" them rather than "liquidate" them. The students found they were no longer arrested and the businessmen found they had, at last, a reasonably stable currency. Against that, both classes had to set the undoubted fact that they were living under a totalitarian government. Mao has made no bones about that. "We are told that we are totalitarian," he says in his latest published work. "This is correct. . . The experience of the Chinese people over the last decades tells us that we must create the democratic dictatorship of the people." By "the people"

Mao means four classes, the city proletariat, the peasants, the national capitalists, and bourgeoisie. Only "the people" have votes and it is their business to act as dictators over the "reactionaries". All this sounds like the familiar totalitarian nonsense, and as if the "people" really meant all those who agree with the government and "reactionaries" those who don't. It is worth noting, though, that Mao admits that some good, or "national", capitalists are still necessary, and that the peasants must, for the moment, keep their land. He aims at establishing Communism, but not for a long time yet.

The biggest problem that faced the Communists was that they conquered China much more quickly than they expected. They were hardly ready to take over the administration of big cities, and when at first they found themselves in control of them, they turned all their attention to this new problem and rather neglected the countryside. They had bad luck, too, with crop failures, so that although they are still fairly popular with the peasants in the areas which have been Communist for a long time, there has been real misery, starvation, and consequent rebellion in some of the newly communized areas. This rebellion is being put down with increasing severity and a growing number of reports of public executions are coming in. They are said to "improve the political consciousness" of the audience quite considerably. The attitude of the people in these districts is well described by a proverb going round China just now. "When the Communists come," it says, "first heads will nod, then heads will shake, then heads will fall."

The youth of the country, however, and most of the population are probably still solidly behind the Communists, if only because they are honest and efficient as best they can be; and because there is no alternative.

The unrest among the peasants is simply the eternal local rebellion against poverty and tyrannical governments. But tyranny is nothing new in China, and the "bandits" have, as yet, no rallying point. If they ever did rally to anything it would be to something new, not to a return of the Kuo Min-Tang, and least of all to the return of the Kuo Min-Tang as the agents of the United Nations. For the United Nations to the Chinese are, alas, "foreigners," and the one thing which is certain is that no Chinese party can hope to succeed if it is believed to be acting under the control of foreigners. To the Chinese soldier this is also the one deciding issue. He has always been patient and cheerful, with a wonderful sense of humor, ready to go where he is sent and fight, without much enthusiasm, if he has to: I do not think he is so changed that he will fight with great enthusiasm for "Communism": but he will fight now against foreigners, especially if China itself is threatened. That is why Communist propaganda always tries to make out that the Kuo Min-Tang are "lackeys of the Americans" and that America wants to invade China. It is the one slogan which will unite the country and inflame the Army. And so we come to the answer to our second mystery.



VII. COMMUNIST PLANS.

People often ask whether Mao is a "puppet" of Stalin. On the answer to this question depends the future of China, and should depend our own policy. The extreme view of those who believed in Mao's independence is that the Chinese Communists are really just agrarian reformers carrying out the "Chinese" revolution and keeping in with Russia because, for the moment, it pays. This might have been true about some of the "amateur" Communist parties of Southeast Asia, but applied to the Chinese it is a fantastic misjudgment. Mao and his associates are passionate and lifelong Communists. But Tito is a passionate and lifelong Communist and so was Trotsky, and they have both accused Stalin of "betraying the Revolution." So the real question is whether the Chinese Communists are working out their own revolution, or acting as puppets under the Russians.

The safest way to judge is to look at the facts. The Chinese are traditionally realists and one of Mao's often quoted sayings is "From Facts get Reality." The great difference between the Chinese and the genuinely puppet states of Eastern Europe is the power position. Russia has been able to impose a Russian commander-in-chief on the Polish Army, because, if it came to a quarrel between the Russian and Polish Communist parties, Russia could overwhelm Poland in a few weeks. The reverse is



Communist troops go through bayonet drill in accepted fashion

true in the Far East. If there *was* a split, China could overrun the Russian Far Eastern provinces just as Japan could have done. Russia's Far Eastern policy up to 1942 was to avoid, at all costs, another war with Japan, and since the failure of Borodin's mission she has been very careful indeed not to interfere openly in Chinese affairs. This only means, of course, that the Chinese are not *unwilling* puppets, as, for instance, the Czechs are.

It is still possible that Mao "takes orders from the Kremlin" because he believes that this is the right Communist course, and therefore the right course for China. It is one of the doctrines of the Kremlin that the "capitalist" states are out to destroy "socialism" throughout the world, and that therefore no socialist state is safe and no communist state possible until capitalism has been destroyed. In this fight, they say, Russia is the natural leader of the socialist states, and the threat to their common existence demands that they should all follow her lead. As far as the facts of history go, all one can say of Mao's past career is that he has never openly gone against the party line—but whether that is from blind loyalty or because the Russians have taken care that the party line suited China, no one can tell. The intervention in Korea seems to be a special case. It seems unlikely that it was part of anyone's original plan—Mao's or Stalin's, for if it had been it should have come much earlier. It seems more likely to have been decided at the last moment because somebody—either the Chinese or the Politburo—believed that the United Nations' advance to the Korean border was a definite threat to the Manchurian arsenals of Communist China. And this seems to me much more likely to have been a decision made by Mao than by Stalin. This view is borne out by the fact that the Chinese are not at the moment sending serious expeditionary forces to attack Hong Kong, Indo-China, or Tibet. Only in Korea, where they thought they saw a threat to China itself, have they intervened in strength.

Important, though less important than the facts, are Mao's words. In these he gives the impression of being a loyal Communist, but a partner or pupil of Stalin rather than a subordinate. "Externally, we must unite in a common struggle with peoples of all countries and with those nations which treat us as equals." He says, again, in his latest published article, "This means allying ourselves with the Soviet Union, with every new Democratic country, and with the proletariat and broad masses in all other countries. 'You incline to one side' people say. That is right. The Chinese people must either incline toward the side of imperialism or towards that of socialism. There can be no exception to this rule. Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union." Of course there is plenty of "Stalin-worship" in the pronouncements of Chinese Communists, but this is only to be expected. The first significant point in Mao's statement of policy is the view of China as an "ally" of Russia. The idea that she is a puppet seems absurd to Chinese eyes and when Secretary Dean Acheson warned the Chinese of Russian designs in Manchuria, there was no attempt to suppress this "foreign propaganda." On the contrary, his letter was printed in full and ridiculed in the Chinese press. The second important point is the emphasis on anti-imperialism. The "peoples nationalism" is still the best emotional rallying point in China, and there are still thousands of Chinese who believe that because Chiang Kai-Shek's government is recognized by the UN the "foreigners" will one day try to use it for an invasion of China. The two Revolutions are still entangled, and as long as the "Chinese Revolution" seems to be threatened, the Communist leaders will stick close to Russia in the belief that she is the only reliable ally. If that arrangement ever came to an end we might see anything—even the Chinese and Russian Communists drifting apart. USMC

In Brief

Sixteen UN nations and the Republic of Korea suffered 306,070 casualties in the 18 months from 25 June 1950, to 31 December 1951. Of the total, ROK casualties—dead, wounded, missing, and captured—numbered 192,960, and U. S. casualties 103,739. Casualties for the 15 other nations were 9,401. The report was issued by UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

MajGen F. E. Lowe, USA, President Truman's observer in Korea, has written a report that the U.S. Marine is the best fighting man in the world, according to a Washington *Daily News* dispatch. Lowe is quoted as saying: "The safest place in Korea was right behind a platoon of Marines. Lord, how they could fight! The Reds told us they were afraid to tangle with Marines and avoided them when they could. It is utterly impossible for me to express in words my admiration and respect. . . ."

Libya is the first nation to achieve sovereignty through direct action by the United Nations. Left is King Edris I, who proclaimed the independence of the former Italian colony in Africa last December. Since W W II, Libya had been one of the non-self governing territories.

A steam-operated catapult able to launch the most modern carrier-borne planes has been developed by the British Admiralty. A light carrier, *H.M.S. Perseus,* is testing U.S. Navy planes with the Atlantic Fleet.

The big medical news of the month for troops is a needle-less hypodermic which forces the "shot" through skin pores with a high pressure air jet—thus eliminating a puncture and pain sensation. It's now in advanced stages of testing by the Army Medical Corps.

The first inshore fire support ship (IFS) is being constructed by the Navy for close-in support of amphibious assaults (see *Firepower and the Amphibious Assault* page 60). Its simple design will facilitate mass production if necessary. Rapid-fire rocket launchers will be its main armament.



This is the first photo of the delta-wing Convair XF-92A with afterburner added for additional thrust. It is an experimental ship designed to explore flight characteristics of a true delta wing.

First of the Marine Corps rifle and pistol competitions for 1952 will get under way 21 April when the western division matches are held at MCRD, San Diego. Eastern competition will be held 2-7 June at Camp Lejeune, and Corps-wide matches for the Laucheimer Trophy, Elliott, and Wirgman Trophy and the inter-division matches to be held there 8-21 June. Marine Corps Memorandum 5-52 contains the instructions.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will start classes soon to train officers and civilians of 12 countries. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has announced in Paris that about 50 officers will be in the first Defense College class, representing all the armed services in the 12 countries of NATO. VAdm A. G. Lemonnier, naval deputy to Gen Eisenhower, will be the first commandant of the school.

The Marine Corps now has an armor vest under mass production that will guard against fragmentation injuries that now cause 70 per cent of all combat casualties. Weighing seven and three-quarters pounds, the armor surrounds the torso without hampering movement. It is made of overlapping plates of laminated fiber glass and a multilayered nylon fabric. In tests with patrols in Korea it stopped .45 caliber slugs from a pistol and a tommy-gun.

War correspondents Marguerite Higgins, Jim G. Lucas, and David Duncan have been cited by the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association for their reporting of Marine action in the Korean war. Miss Higgins is correspondent for the New York *Herald Tribune*, and Lucas and Duncan, both Marine reserve officers, covered for Scripps Howard newspapers and *Life* magazine, respectively.

The army has developed a new and unorthodox uniform designed to protect against poison gas and biological agents. It is an airtight, water-cooled suit.

The 5th Mar Div Association has set up the first scholarship fund to be sponsored by Marine division organizations. Recipients will be children of 5th Mar Div veterans killed or fatally wounded in action. Contributions and information queries should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer, 5th Mar Div Association, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

Marine Corps personnel allotted over 10 million dollars from their pay for Defense Bonds in 1951, about 3 million dollars more than in 1950.

Pictured above is the Army's new .30-caliber rifle, designed for full or semi-automatic fire. It weighs only eight pounds and its performance is said to compare favorably with the M-1.

The third annual Armed Forces Day will be observed Saturday, 17 May. "Unity-Strength-Freedom" will be the official slogan, according to the Defense Department announcement.

Capt Gaylord Guthneckt (center below) demonstrates a new foam rubber "long underwear" designed by Maj Victor J. Layton USA (left), for wearing under the regular work uniform. It would replace the old "longies" worn by Lt Fredreck Adams (right) and weighs only a fifth as much. The Marine pilots are with Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 in Korea. It has been combat-tested in sub-zero weather.

NOBODY wants to



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FIGHTING MAN

By 1stLt Lawrence V. Ryan

THE MOST DISCONCERTING THING ABOUT OUR PRESENT defense effort is that, in theory, everyone hates Communist aggression and wants forces raised to check its advance, but practically no one wants to share in the task himself. Nobody wants to get down in the sand and mud and grapple with the enemy. There appears to be a naive belief among many Americans that if the need arises, the job will be done by some phantom army that will spring up, as if by magic, and instantly overwhelm the foe.

Even persons who are more realistic, or at least more pessimistic, assume that someone else should be there to meet any attack that may come. One widespread sentiment is that Western Europeans are not ready to do their part, that they may not reach the quotas which General Eisenhower's command deems necessary for our mutual defense. It does not, apparently, occur to such critics that Europeans have much more reason to feel the same way about us. Judging from our attitude and conduct at home since the outbreak of the Korean war, they would certainly be justified in doing so.

If there is such a suspicion on their part, it is not essentially the consequence of our unwillingness to make ma-

terial sacrifices in order to prepare for defense. The rest of the world, whatever it might prefer of us, is aware that we will insist on our luxuries as long as we may possibly retain them. It is aware that the citizens of other countries will be required to expend their comforts and personal security at a faster and proportionately higher rate than we shall—it is aware of all this and will undoubtedly allow us our privileges. But we cannot be certain that the rest of the world will trust our sincerity when it observes the present attitude in this country toward military service.

In nearly every other country, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the average citizen enters the Armed Forces expecting to be trained for combat. The U.S.S.R. has placed its emphasis on infantry and artillery with the result that it is capable of throwing scores of divisions into action on each of several fronts. Marshal Tito, with an army and militia of 500,000 men, has managed to create about 30 divisions. At the outbreak of the Korean war, we had less than a dozen—in an army half again larger than Yugoslavia's. It is true that in most other armies, a division is a smaller unit than it is in our Army or Marine Corps, but it is still obvious that our country, which must keep an eye on several continents, should have at least as many *combat* troops as a nation that has only its own borders to protect. However, in our Armed Forces most of the men are auxiliaries or non-combatants, and most persons entering the service expect, as their birthright, to become part of the majority.

THE FACT IS nobody wants to be a fighting man. This does not mean that everybody who is eligible for military duty is trying to avoid it, although there is a great deal of that, too. It means precisely that nobody wants to be a *fighting* man. Everybody is trying to escape assignment to the Marine Corps, the infantry, and, to a lesser extent, any other branch of the service which makes a business of coming into direct, life-and-death contact with the enemy. Many young Americans are sedulously trying to avoid wearing any kind of uniform; the greater number of them, and this is really more shocking, are trying to hide inside of one.

Part of the explanation of this attitude lies in the recency of the last war. The men and boys who are now about to enter the Armed Forces were passing through a highly impressionable stage of life at that time, and they know and have talked to men who participated in the conflict. This is the first generation of Americans which is fully aware that there is something other to do in the service than carry a rifle. Most of the men who enlisted or were drafted during WW II had little idea that one's skin is considerable safer in a motor-repair pool or a paymaster's office than it is in a front-line rifle platoon. Their younger brothers and neighbors, on the contrary, have had the distinction very clearly made for them, largely through the advice and experience of the returned veterans.

Then again, the Armed Forces between wars did a bad job of convincing recruits that fighting is really the main business of a military man after all. Enlistment posters gave the impression that the services were chiefly concerned with producing highly skilled technicians in a large number of fields which differed little from civilian trades and occupations. The average recruit must have believed he was joining up in order to prepare for civiilan life. And to a great extent, that is exactly what he was doing in many cases. Only after the drive out of the Pusan beachhead and the Inchon landing did the posters begin to change.

THE EFFECT HAS BEEN that those who feel that military service is imminent for them are likely to rush to join the non-combatant branches of the Armed Forces. Everyone who has had his eyes and ears open for the past several years knows that the average sailor, quartermaster clerk, or Air Force ground crewman stands an excellent chance of never getting near the rattle of small arms fire, if he gets close to any kind of physical danger at all. Consequently, our finest physical and mental specimens intend to occupy their time in the service issuing shoes and trousers and mess kits, or attending long-term technical schools in order to learn how to tend some highlv complicated machine which is too valuable to be exposed to possible destruction or capture by the enemy. What other conclusion can one reach, when the Marine Corps itself, in whose uniform it was once the pride of American youth to serve, has had to resort to the draft to fill out its ranks?

If young men today want to fight at all, they want to be pilots, or radio operators, or officers aboard cruisers and aircraft carriers. Our American love of gadgets ac-

counts in part for this desire. Anyone who has been aboard a battleship, or has seen the instrument panel of a bomber, can sympathize with the feeling. But the psychology of the matter goes deeper than that. There is something antiseptic and highly impersonal (at least while one has the upper hand) in naval and aerial combat. The pilot who strafes an armored patrol or a column of infantry makes his pass and is gone so rapidly that the results of his attack are unknown to him. The naval officer whose battery sinks an enemy destroyer, or levels a village suspected of containing a battalion of hostile soldiers, never sees the real effects of his fire. He may, in many cases, not even see the explosion of his shells. Only an aviator can ever say, like the Italian flier in the Ethiopian war, that "the burst of the bombs was like the unfolding of the petals of flowers."

THE INFANTRYMAN, on the other hand, after a particularly murderous exchange of fire, advances or retreats and finds before his eyes only too graphic a picture of the effects of his and the enemy's marksmanship. He alone can get really angry about what has been done to him and his companions; he alone can become really determined about what he must do to other men and their companions if he wishes to stay alive. It is a messy business, but it does place him in situations that challenge his manhood and force him daily to argue down his sense of fear and repugnance. Since the physical and psychological hardships are real and immediate, there is no chance for him to make a heartless or indifferent game of the task. Since he is stripped down to relatively primitive, hand-operated weapons, his personal strength and valor are of considerable importance. He is like all other fighting men of all ages, matching his individual strength and cunning against those of his enemy in close battle. There is none of the disinterested thrill of the gadgeteer in it for him. Few people who have been educated to admire and rely on what the mechanically ingenious can do are apt to want to throw their dependence on their own personal resources. Few of them, trained as disembodied parts of complicated machines, will want to be made conscious of the crude fact of the existence and importance of their own bodies by enduring cold, pain, or even mere discomfort.

Another contributing factor is the present draft policy. The number of possible reasons for deferment is so great that the man who is finally "caught" feels himself to be the unlucky exception to the rule. Naturally, in WW II the reverse was true. Only the few escaped service between 1941-1946, so that ultimate enlistment or induction was accepted as the common lot. But now, with prospects of withholding the more intelligent college students from service as a special class, with the possibiilty of total deferment of key industrial and agricultural workers, and with several other reasons for excluding men from military duty, only the unwary are likely to be snared. At least this is a reasonable assumption, and it is reflected in the attitude of young men and their families. Many parents plan to enter their eighteen-year-old sons in colleges with ROTC units immediately upon their graduation from high school. Their hope is that the boys will be able to qualify for the reserve officers' programs and so escape service for at least four years. They seem to feel that by that time the mobilization program may have

slowed down—and besides, a large number of the ROTC programs are designed to train ordnance, communications, and supply officers. Moreover, the number of parents whose sons have suddenly turned up with medical and scientific aspirations has increased remarkably.

The total effect of all these things has been to produce a generation that does not want to be Marines or combat soldiers under any circumstances. Freedom is something desirable, true, but there will always be someone else to fight for it. And while that someone else is doing the dirty work, our young men want to issue the equipment, operate the machines, or stay at home and ignore the whole affair.

As a nation we are just beginning to realize the dangerous implications of this attitude. But if the same realization does not come very soon to those individual Americans who are of age for military service, a whole generation may lose completely the necessary will to fight—of which all victory is the product. USMC

DANGER!

By LtCol Harry W. Edwards

North Koreans booby-trapped some of their own dead

MINES

PROBABLY NO SINGLE WEAPON IN THE RED ARSENAL has been as effective as the mine in producing casualties among UN forces in Korea.

Let us examine this menace and consider its many aspects.

The most prevalent Red antipersonnel mine is the Schu mine, aptly named because its detonation often results in the loss of a foot. This is a very handy mine that lends itself to ready planting and is not easily detected. It is a typical CCF mine, consisting of a crudely constructed wooden box with a hinged lid, and is about [illegible] as a cigar box. The explosive charge is [illegible] TNT which has been cut from [illegible] Soviet booster charge. The mine is [illegible]

The deadly [illegible] Korea [illegible] methods of [illegible] momentum of [illegible]

Tanks wait while mines are cleared

The job is slow and dangerous and the mine menace is omnipresent . . . probably no other Red weapon has been as effective as the land mine

Soviet MUV pull-type fuze which projects through the front wall of the hinged lid. It is hard to handle for two reasons: Only two pounds pressure detonates the mine and it has almost no metal to register on a mine detector.

ON THE ANTITANK SIDE OF THE LEDGER, we find the box mine is the most common garden variety in Korea. This mine is most adaptable since it can be utilized for antitank purposes by securing the wooden lever into the tongue and groove compartment on the top. This prevents detonation unless a tank-size weight is applied. It is easy to rig these, one above the other, to multiply their power. Tank personnel will attest to their damaging effect on vehicles and personnel. In fact, the tanks have been dubbed the "Mine Clearance Battalion" because of their effective job in locating these contrivances—much to their discomfiture and embarrassment. It became necessary to reinforce the tanks to protect personnel from the blast effect of these box mines.

But we have not yet exhausted the possibilities of the box mine. By leaving the wooden arm extended or even by breaking it off completely, the gadget becomes a good antivehicle mine. This reduces the pressure needed to detonate vehicles by lessening the strength of the box top. Simple, isn't it?

Let's go one step further to see how this contrivance is rigged for antipersonnel work. By slightly elevating the sectional lid of the box, the mine will detonate under very light pressure. No structural changes are required to make this a triple-threat blockbuster. The mine packs a TNT punch that varies depending on the size box used, and is usually fuzed by a Soviet MV-5 pressure fuze. This fuze and the previously-mentioned Soviet MUV pull-type fuze are the two common fuzes utilized in Korea. The box mine is often boobytrapped with grenades to make it an even more difficult problem for removal.

Although the Schu and box mine are the most common, in order to run the full gamut of mines encountered by the 1st Mar Div, several others cannot be overlooked.

UNFORTUNATELY, there were many of our own mines which were captured and used against us. These included the M2 and M2A3 "Bouncing Betty" for antipersonnel and the M6 and M7 for antitank employment. Frequently they have been combined with CCF mines to provide a more effective charge. Under the heading of "liberated" equipment, we must also include the common Jap mines which were prevalent in the last war and are also used by the Reds in this one. Nor can we overlook the use of mortar shells, sometimes our own, that the Reds have learned to rig as mines. These have proved very effective on occasion.

The arsenal is not complete without the inclusion of

bangalore torpedoes, 55-gallon drum mines, pole charges, and explosive charges. All have been encountered and have made their contribution as casualty-producers. To combat these mines the 1st Eng Bn and the Shore Party Bn have worked long and hard.

The mine menace is serious enough so that many units insist on an engineer sweep before they move out. The 1st Eng Bn can verify the truth of Bill Mauldin's famous cartoon of WW II showing a line of armored vehicles led by a solitary G.I. with a mine detector.

When mines are detected they are either blown in place or removed for analysis by the Army engineer's technical intelligence detachment. This unit has a vast collection of all types of mines and has made careful study of them. This kind of intelligence saves lives and also overcomes the fear that men have when dealing with the unknown.

The Marines have discovered that the enemy follows no set pattern in planting his mine crop. The mines are strewn wholesale and it is doubtful if any record is kept of their location, even in static-type defense positions. Roads and trails are, of course, areas of greatest concentration. On roads, mines have been found in every possible arrangement — on top, buried, pushed in from the side, set singly or as many as five deep, located at different depths etc. The reactions from these plantings have varied from small explosions with the effect of only shaking up the personnel in vehicles, to violent blasts that raise an M46 tank or TD18 dozer into the air and leave a crater about the size of the vehicle. Removal of these mines is complicated by the fact there is so much infiltration into areas which had previously been swept and marked safe. These areas are often heavily re-mined under cover of darkness. Infiltration is difficult to combat because one Korean is not readily distinguishable from another and the Reds have capitalized heavily on that fact. Therefore, the mine menace will probably continue to be omnipresent.

Winter operations have tended to reduce the effectiveness of mining because frozen ground usually makes mines inoperable. However, an afternoon thaw will convert a road that had been considered safe into a dangerous obstacle course, so great precautions must be taken in evaluating trafficability of roads.

WHAT THEN ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED? We have discoverd that mines are most efficient casualty producers but that widespread dissemination of information on the types employed is the best insurance in combating them, and lessening their effect on troop morale. We have also learned that our own minefields must be charted as carefully as humanly possible to prevent casualties among our own personnel. Also, we have become aware of the need for a handy, light antipersonnel mine that is a guaranteed casualty producer; sort of a counterpart of the Red Schu mine that would be even more adaptable than our present "Bouncing Betty" model. In that connection, one wonders whatever happened to the antipersonnel gadget of WW II days known as the "Hotfoot." This cartridge-sized contrivance would fill a real need among the family of ordnance items designed for mining operations today. And finally, we realize the need for constant improvement in our methods of mine detection and clearance in order to achieve quick and efficient neutralization of the enemy mine fields. USMC



Mines kept this tank from completing its mission

Learned

ANOTHER WINTER HAS PASSED SINCE WE OF THE 7TH Marines led the charge up to the Chosin Reservoir during November of 1950, and many more men of the Corps have found out what it's like to fight over mountainous terrain in freezing weather. Still, I feel the lessons we learned up north bear repeating. Even though many of the cold weather problems have been solved by now, many have not. And I'm certain that I can count on my brothers-in-arms, who fought on the central Korean front this last winter, to set me straight on any of my information that is now out of date.

Because there are times in a Marine's life when his most important possession—above chow and water—is his weapon, we will start with the one on which his "Creed" is based—the M-1 rifle. The M-1 still is a great weapon in any clime, hot or cold, if kept clean. In fact, the M-1 and the .30 cal. machine guns all performed well if covered with just a "hair" of light oil or none at all.

Up North

By 1stLt William J. Davis



The care and cleaning of the M-1 is easily understood by the average Marine and he had good luck with it, except in one respect. If he did a lot of heavy firing with the rifle and didn't get a chance to clean it, the barrel became quite pitted. This also was the case with the BAR. The only individual weapon which did not develop a pitted barrel was the carbine, due to the non-corrosive primer in the cartridge. However, in cold weather, when it could not be kept absolutely clean, the carbine was next to useless since the power generated by the cartridge was not sufficient to provide positive locking and unlocking with the slightest bit of dirt, snow, or ice present. I know that I kept mine as clean as possible, yet it froze up after we got back to Hagaru-ri and never was as reliable after that.

Perhaps if the cartridge for the M-1 and BAR could have a non-corrosive primer, the barrels would stay in better shape during prolonged periods when men don't have time or are too exhausted to clean their weapons. Besides, if good fire discipline prevails, the loss of range caused by the non-corrosive primer will not be felt much since there is normally no reason for a Marine to shoot beyond his weapon's maximum effective range.

SGT MCKELLAR, OUR COMPANY ARMORER, suggested that the individual Marine be allowed to take down the buffer and rate-reducing mechanism of his BAR. For example, when we went through Seoul to Uijongbu and back to Seoul again, dust collected around the buffer head and sear release, and thus, when we got up north, the sear release froze, thereby securing the slow automatic rate of fire.

One reason for many weapons freezing was our practice, through sheer habit, of bringing our weapons out of the cold whenever we were fortunate enough to spend a few moments in a warming tent or, if the situation allowed, putting them inside our shelter tents. When the weapons were brought in, the metal began to "sweat" and when we took them out again, they immediately froze up. Obviously, the solution here is to leave your weapon outside in the cold at all times during winter campaigns. If the weapon is kept at a fairly constant temperature and has little or no oil on it, it will function properly.

The .45 caliber pistol is not completely useless, but except for purposes of wearing it to chow in a rear area or blasting a man apart as a last resort, it is not too efficient. Many of the lads in our company carried their own personal .38-caliber revolvers with them. For test purposes, when we took a short break at Hongchon in April, I set up a small range in an isolated draw and tested both hand guns. While the average man was only a fair shot with the .45, which he had fired before, he was a good to excellent shot with the .38, even though he had *never* fired it before. I was amazed at the lack of recoil in the .38, and the rapid speed with which a novice could learn to pick off empty cans at 30 yards.

The .38, especially the Smith & Wesson Combat Masterpiece with its adjustable rear sight, was a potent weapon in the hands of my men. It could be cleaned easily, and was a much safer weapon for constant use. We who have seen peacetime duty in the Corps know only too well how eccentric the .45 can be. How many are the guard shacks that have ventilated overheads from "empty" weapons being cleaned? The 1911 and 1911A1 might have been fine for blasting "bushwackers" in the old Corps but, for my money, we should trade the .45 pistol for the .38 revolver, and also should make it a T/O weapon for the rifle squad leader, and the gunners and their assistants in mortar sections and machine gun platoons. The leader is supposed to control his men's fire and not shoot his own weapon at the enemy while there is an alternative. The .38 would be very adequate considering this.

A weapon we found admirable for overhead close support was the 57mm recoilless rifle. It is ideal for knocking out enemy installations and can be moved fairly rapidly. The 75mm recoilless is more powerful, but rarely could be moved rapidly enough to do the rifle companies much good. Perhaps the 57mm could replace our 3.5-inch rocket launchers which were not exactly balls of fire in the cold, and were used for the same missions as the 57s when there were no tanks around. A 57mm canister round would be a fine thing to have at the onset of an enemy "banzai," and the ammunition could be carried in much the same manner as 60mm mortar ammo.

ANOTHER THING on which the T/A seemed to cut us short was the number of WP grenades available. What a sensational morale factor for the frontline foxholer to toss one of those among a dozen charging Chinese! And

the WP grenades—or lack of them—remind me of the 60mm mortar whose WP shell is definitely not potent enough. It should contain about three times as much phosphorous as it does, and in cold weather, the 60mm illuminating shell was effective only about 25 percent of the time. I used many rounds at our first meeting with the Chinese just south of Sudong in fairly warm weather, and they worked fine. Then I used rounds from the very

same batch up at Yudam-ni and they flickered momentarily and fizzled down through the snow. Perhaps a few Chinese were burned but we never knew. I had fair luck with a charge of five increments, which pushed the rounds high enough so they shed some light before they fizzled out. The HE round is not overly potent, but not many enemy keep their heads up when they are under a 60 barrage. It really puts the fear of God into them!

The mortar tube held up well in cold weather, but the bipods did not last long if the ground was not given a good going-over with a pick mattock prior to setting up the weapon. And when we had to fire on short notice, the cement-like terrain under the scraped-away snow was like firing off the fantail of an APA. Some old mortarman should work out a better shock system—the 60 really needs it!

SINCE I AM PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED ONLY with the rifle company's weapons in Korea, perhaps some more qualified Marine could give us the dope on how artillery, 81s, 4.2, and aircraft weapons held up under the adverse conditions experienced in the severe cold.

While each Marine has variations in his taste, on the whole most of the hardchargers found no serious fault with the C-rations. They offered, with their three heavies, three lights, fruit, and other essentials including cigarettes, a fairly well-balanced diet which did not leave too many men griping. However, in cold weather it was the consensus that an extra meal was needed, or a ration of four boxes of C-ration for three men. Energy-giving foods such as sugar were what our bodies craved. The circular cake of sugar in the old C-3s, plus the cereal bar, really went down nicely on a nippy morning. As far as candy went, I think we consumed more in one cold Korea week than we averaged in a Stateside year. After our trek down to the trucks and trains south of Chinhung-ni, at the bottom of "the Pass," I saw many others do as I did—eat six or seven large Tootsie Rolls within a 10-15 minute period. In cold weather you just cannot offer a Marine too much in the way of sweets. And he can eat this energy-giving nourishment in quick gulps while on the march or in a fast-moving attack.

For some reason, Supply was always informing us of the lack of C-rations available, so that most troops, except the companies actually in the immediate frontlines, received Baker rations much of the time during the central front campaign. While in warm weather the B-rations are a welcome rest from cooking your own chow, the pork-beef-and-gravy diet got "old" pretty rapidly. And since the B-rations didn't have cigarettes, the "smoke" situation often got acute, something that rarely happened with the Cs. With the advent of the new C-7s, powdered milk was a welcome addition to our inevitable canteen cup of coffee, but ofttimes the C-7 contained all crackers and no jam, or all jam and no crackers, or cocoa in

place of the advertised candy. And the small single can of fruit really raised a rumpus. Bring back the two half-cans of fruit!

ALL IN ALL, THE CHOW was adequate, but as I said in my last letter to the editor, heating it in the cold without burning at least the bottom quarter of it was almost a culinary impossibility! While some Marines have told me my proposed sardine can would cost someone (Who? The taxpayer! What are we?) too much money for retooling, the important thing is to get the chow to fighting men so they can eat it under severe conditions. The bulky cylindrical can is OK in a rear-echelon warming tent, but how about the hardcharger who tries to stuff them into the old-type utility trousers pocket?

Pipe and cigarette smokers fared well, but a few good cigars in the PX packets would go right well for the minority who happen to be so addicted. Keep a few of those cigarettes for duty in seaport towns like Pohang which, by the way, offer excellent shrimp, crabmeat, and fish—a welcome change from a meat and beans diet!

Let's stop fighting the supply problem. Why can't we find some means of supplying the troops with the necessities which can be carried without undue strain? Why send them charging off into the hills with a field transport pack such as those worn by the lads who replaced us at the airfield between Hongchon and Wonju?

I realize the field transport pack looks good, but I think it's impractical. We who had to wrestle with those rolls daily up north found that we had to take our mittens off to grip the roll tight enough. Since this method, if carried on for a long enough period of time leads to the losing of fingers, it is not to be encouraged. The solution is, of course, the packboard with the waterproof bag which is made to house the sleeping bag. Put your poncho and shelterhalf flat on your packboard and then put your sleeping bag, toilet articles, perhaps some writing paper, one set of skivvies, and two or three pairs of socks inside the waterproof bag, and either buckle (with quick release straps, if you're fortunate enough to get them) or tie the bag on your packboard. Then you are ready to charge, and no matter how chilly the atmosphere, you will still have all your fingers because the packboard can be packed with your mittens on.

AND THAT IS ALL THE GEAR you need on your back! What about extra utility suits, extra this, and extra that? That's just it—they are extra! You do not need them. How long did I haul two extra sets of utilities, three extra sets of skivvies, and five pairs of socks on my back, and for what? To develop an aching back, that's for what! If it is warm enough to take a bath, (and if you can't take a bath, why change anything but your socks?), there is no reason why the Bath and Laundry Platoon cannot carry around enough clean utilities, skivvies, socks, etc., to take care of all hands. And let's see that these laundry lads have "stencil pencils" so they can mark the clothing correctly as it is turned in. After all, someone may have to wear those trousers for a month and if they are not

the right size, he will be that much less efficient in the hill-climbing job.

BY TURNING IN YOUR DIRTY CLOTHES, you don't have to lug extra gear around the hills. When it is very cold you will have so many clothes on your body that you would not think of peeling them off in order to change your "skivs," so let's stop kidding ourselves on this score. We in the 7th Marines went 46 days without a bath or shower that winter. But what if Marines have to stay in the lines longer than 46 days during freezing weather? How will they get clean? I imagine showers can be set up in the rear areas, but I think one shower bath for the entire winter would be plenty—seriously. The big worry is not how much dirt gets on your body, but how much ice water gets on it.

Two things that we considered quite essential for cold weather fighting were a small hatchet, which we didn't have, and the pick mattock, of which we had too few. If you stay in any area for any time at all, the twigs and old logs will soon be used up. If each fire team had a hatchet, it could at least keep warm by cutting standing timber. Those who had pick mattocks could dig holes to keep away from the cold Korean winds and the hot Chinese artillery and mortars. The entrenching tool handles broke off too easily on the icy ground, but of course the entrenching tool can be used after the pick loosens the dirt. One hatchet, one pick mattock, and two entrenching tools for every four men would work out well. Caution: While digging that foxhole or chopping those logs, be sure and get some of that clothing off or at least lossened up. Exercise means sweat; to stop exercising means the sweat freezes. It is that simple, so peel off some of the duds, get the work done, and as you stop exerting yourself and begin to get cold, put the outer clothing on gradually.

Don't forget that we are exponents of the "layer method" by which we wear more than one layer of clothes. We let these layers provide insulation, not so much against the cold coming in, but to kep the warmth of our bodies from going out. I know the quilted Chinese suits look warm, as my lads told me south of Sudong the first time we saw a dead Chinese (3 Nov 50), but what happens when those suits get wet? The man has nothing to keep himself warm if he wants to hang that very unwaterproofed quilt over a fire. No, their system is inferior to ours. However, I will agree that our parka is entirely too heavy. It is warm and keeps you dry and is nice and snug even if you lie down directly in the snow, but it is too much of a load to carry up and down those hills daily—especially if you have a wool sweater, "long-john" top, utility jacket, and field jacket under it. Perhaps those reversible (white on one side—good camouflage) windbreakers like the 7th Inf Div had would do the job. When a platoon moves out at high port wearing parkas, it is a wonder they don't get pneumonia from the quick perspiration caused by this heavy, bulky piece of goods.

Many a rifleman claimed that while the hood kept his neck warm, it cut off his peripheral vision so that he could not see the enemy to his flanks, which is slightly dangerous. I think one of those furlined caps inside a helmet is the answer to this problem.

The nose guards that made their appearance after we got back to Masan came a little late for me. My nose was nipped by the north wind on two occasions, and when it started to thaw out it was a mighty unpleasant sensation! As it thaws, it starts to peel just as from a bad sunburn, and if you stay in the cold and leave it unprotected, it will freeze much more rapidly the next time. If you try to solve this far-from ticklish problem with a towel or muffler, as I did, you will find that you also will be covering your mouth and the moisture from your breath will freeze on the towel, making your face extremely cold. So—the little compact nose guard is the solution. While it certainly doesn't improve one's looks, it's better than losing a nose.

SPEAKING OF YOUR BREATH FREEZING, be sure to shave off your beard and mustache whenever you get the chance. It is almost impossible to see frostbitten skin beneath a beard. That classy handlebar mustache is not so classy when the cold wind makes your nose run and icicles start hanging from it. Some of us made these mistakes. And hair on your face does not—repeat *not*—keep your face warm. If it did, then we would not have to issue winter clothing to those big Marines who have hairy chests, arms, and backs. I was very surprised and not too happy when I shaved aboard the ship at Hungnam to see a spot about the size of a half-dollar on the side of my face which had been nipped and was peeling badly. If I had had no beard, I probably could have prevented further frostbite when I first saw it, or when someone else called it to my attention. When you know frostbite is starting, it is fairly easy to prevent its getting worse by covering.

If you do get frostbitten, do not thaw too rapidly. Too many men, on feeling their feet or fingers go "dead," shuffle over to the nearest fire, pull off their boots (mittens) and shove the chilled members over the flames. The rapid and deep pain suffered by them was rough to watch. Even worse, this practice of applying too much heat too soon causes a long-lasting condition known as chilblains.

Do not *fear* the cold—*respect* it! Your cold-weather clothing will keep you warm if you use it correctly. And the lads from the deep south who paid attention fared just as well as those from the northern states. In fact, I had one fine sergeant who came from New Orleans and had seen snow only in the movies. Yet he did not get



frostbitten and he charged all the way with us.

Some of the equipment allowances, such as 75 compasses per rifle company are entirely too much. Maps in a country like Korea are not available right down to the fire team leader, so extra compasses just get banged up or lost? And how many pairs of wirecutters were left along the wayside?

The canteen did not hold up too well. The cover, at the point it attaches to the belt, should be riveted, not stitched. Because of this, many canteens were lost sliding down 75-degree slopes. Also the cork inside the cover cracked and broke off when the cover was unscrewed. This should be replaced, perhaps by plastic.

Losing a canteen is bad enough, but the loss of a leather outer mitten could be tragic. (And lose them we did, especially when fighting at night.) As a result the unprotected woolen mitten liners quickly wore through when we pulled ourselves up the rocky inclines. Result: Frostbitten fingers. Recommendation: Attach the two mittens together with a line around the neck or pin them on to the parka. They are entirely too essential to risk being lost!

ONE MAN who really had to put out all the time—too much—and needlessly I think, was the radioman carrying the SCR-300. In the August *Leatherneck*, one of these great lads, PFC S. G. Williams, sent his solution as to how he carried his personal gear plus one of those 50-odd pound monstrosities. Where are the newer type radios that I know a great technical-minded country like ours must have? Maybe we do have Stateside warehouses full of SCR-300s that we feel must be used up first for reasons of economy, but I say money isn't everything in this instance. Break out the new radios for these lads who have to run the hills with their company commanders, artillery forward observers, and the like. If the people of America could have seen these lads climbing up and down icy slopes almost beyond human endurance to keep their fellow troops in contact with friendly elements, I think they would gladly donate a few pennies more for such highly important equipment as this. Let's get a radio that is practical for mountain and cold-weather operations! I still do not see how those radiomen did it!

I will never forget the wonderful advice we received in Basic School concerning how our tactics depended—and I quote "on two essential elements, the terrain and the enemy situation!" Well, the terrain and the enemy situation changed many of the "school solutions" in Korea. Rarely, in the northern mountains, did we use the old faithful "two up and one back" formation at company level. Normally, we got up on the high ground and drove forward along a ridge paralleling the MSR. Some of these ice-covered ridges were so treacherous that when a rifle company attacked, it was a squad from the leading platoon that went along the *only* avenue of ap-

proach, the well-beaten path along the ridge line. Why? Because a Rocky Mountain goat could not have scaled the slippery sides of these rocky ridges without falling. Sure, the enemy had this path zeroed in, but when there was only one approach the rifle squad had to use it, with the remainder of the company charging along in column behind. And the same old defensive setup, with "two up and one back," depending on the width of the company's front, was discarded almost always, along with the battalion's MLR, to be replaced by each company setting up its own individual perimeter defense on a single strongpoint. This, in turn, would be a part of the battalion's perimeter defense—and I mean perimeter! When the 7th first drove to Yudam-ni, this was SOP most of the time, mainly because of the enemy's great numerical superiority. The rifle companies and infantry battalions depended on the superb artillery of the 11th Marines and the splendid night and day protection of the 1st Mar Air Wing to keep them tied in.

While the single supply road made the use of tanks illogical, since they might have broken through the poor roads and thus cut off the use of our supply trucks, the one lone tank that did reach us in Yudam-ni made a Heaven-sent point for us as we drove back to Hagaru-ri. I hate to think what "sitting ducks" we would have been to snipers had this tank not kept the enemy pinned down. Tanks may draw fire, but when they return it the enemy really gets down in his foxhole.

Another tactic that always paid off was the time-tested Marine rule of not firing at night unless absolutely necessary. How confused the enemy must have been in his night attacks to hear and then feel hand grenades going off, yet none of his foe showing his position by firing a weapon. Fire discipline at night is still, to my mind, the true test of a good rifle company. When a Marine fires his weapon at night, all hands are alert because they know something is really happening.

One basic tactic that proved itself again and again in Korea, as it has in all this country's past wars, was the old USMC SOP of "don't wait for 'em; go out and get 'em!" It worked in the cold of Yudam-ni as it did in the heat of Iwo Jima, and it will always work. Whether we attack to the front, or, when the enemy outnumbers us 10-to-1, we attack to our rear, "attack" is still the real slogan for the Corps.

I still feel (as I did when I wrote *Supercharge the Hardchargers* for the GAZETTE as we sailed from Inchon to Wosan) that we need improvement in our physical training. When I left Korea in May, the new replacements gazed in awe when they climbed out of their planes and stared at the hills. Lectures, field problems, tactics, range firing, and all the rest are necessary, but men have to be in tip-top mountain-climbing shape when they fight over terrain like Korea. I realize that they can accustom themselves fairly well to hills in a relatively short time, but I do not think it should be thus. I think they should be hardened hill-climbers before they climb aboard ship! Those who went over in the beginning of the emergency did the job they were given, and did it well. But they could have done the same job with much less physical and mental strain if they had been in better physical shape. It could not be helped then; it can from now on.

Last, but far from least, there will always be times in combat when "the old morale" will tend to be just a little low. You might be cold or wet or hungry or just plain scared, but never forget that some great Marines have been the same way all through the years, and many more will be in all the fighting days of the future. When things looked a little bleak, I always liked to look back on the day when we in Able Company tied in, as the 1st Mar Div's left flank, with a company of the 1st Cav Div. After we finished the necessities of sector responsibilities and such and started back down the trail, a grizzled-looking old 1st Cav sergeant slowly ambled over towards us, looked up and down for a moment, and then asked, "Lootenant, where you Marines located?" When I answered that we were on his right flank, he smiled a big, tobacco-filled smile and said, "That is, without a doubt, Lootenant, the best news I've heard since we got on this Rock! *I can't think of anyone I'd rather have on my flanks than a bunch of Marines.*" USMC

KOREA AWARDS

2dLt Archie Van Winkle

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

STAFF SERGEANT ARCHIE VAN WINKLE, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Platoon Sergeant in Company B, First Battalion, Seventh Marines,, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Sudong, Korea, on 2 November 1950. Immediately rallying the men in his area after a fanatical and numerically superior enemy force penetrated the center of the line under cover of darkness and pinned down the platoon with a devastating barrage of deadly automatic weapons and grenade fire, Staff Sergeant Van Winkle boldly spearheaded a determined attack through withering fire against hostile frontal positions and, though he and all the others who charged with him were wounded, succeeded in enabling his platoon to gain the fire superiority and the opportunity to reorganize. Realizing that the left-flank squad was isolated from the rest of the unit, he rushed through forty yards of fierce enemy fire to reunite his troops despite an elbow wound which rendered one of his arms totally useless. Severely wounded a second time when a direct hit in the chest from a hostile hand grenade caused serious and painful wounds, he staunchly refused evacuation and continued to shout orders and words of encouragement to his depleted and battered platoon. Finally carried from his position unconscious from shock and loss of blood, Staff Sergeant Van Winkle served to inspire all who observed him to heroic efforts in successfully repulsing the enemy attack. His superb leadership, vallant fighting spirit and unfaltering devotion to duty in the face of heavy odds reflect the highest credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service."

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Medal of Honor (posthumously)

PFC Walter C. Monegan, Jr., 2dLt Robert D. Reem, and SSgt William G. Windrich.

Navy Cross

1stLt Welton R. Abel, 1stLt Harrison F. Betts, Capt Richard R. Breen, PFC Joseph A. Blick and 1stLt Chew Een Lee.

Distinguished Service Medal (Navy)

MajGen Oliver P. Smith.

Silver Star

1stLt Robert H. Uskurait, Sgt Clarence N. Van Meter, SSgt Stanley Wawnzyniak, Cpl Benton F. Wilson, Cpl John W. Wishard, PFC Ronald G. York and Sgt Anthony Zacharia.

Legion of Merit

LtCol Charles L. Banks and LtCol Carl J. Cagle.

Distinguished Flying Cross

Capt Frank Ashe, Capt Raymond W. Baker, Capt Byron H. Beswick, Capt Lincoln Boyd, Jr., and 1stLt Philip R. Burnham.

Bronze Star

Maj Joseph L. Abel, Maj Donald V. Anderson, Sgt John M. Anderson, Sgt Dean W. Armstrong, Maj Richard N. Aufmann and 1stLt Joseph A. Borowski.

TURKEY
at the Straits

By SqdrnLdr John Gellner, RCAF



"On the right wing of the allied advance the Turkish brigade in Korea ran into Communist fire from a snub-nosed hill. Looking like warriors of another age, in their greatcoats and sweeping mustaches, the Turks applied their standard solution—they fixed bayonets and charged. The Chinese ran." From *TIME*, February 5th, 1951

THE INDOMITABLE COURAGE AND HIGH MORALE OF Turkish troops in Korea seems to have come as a surprise to a good many people but it did not surprise those who knew the Turk as a man and a fighter. Field Marshal Lord Wavell wrote of the Turkish soldier he had faced in WW I, "As a fighter he is unlike any other soldier in the world. Even when he is wretchedly fed and miserably equipped he will continue month after month and year after year a dangerous foe . . . No set of circumstances, however depressing, appear able to diminish his dogged resistance." The proud virility of the Turks may be a racial attribute, but it is also a product of necessity, that sternest of all educators. Destiny placed the few million Turks athwart one of the great lifelines of the world, and by so doing it has put Turkey in the position of the man who tries to hold shut a door through which many enemies are trying to break. That door is the Straits. To defend the latter, the Turks have had to fight for centuries. The



Straits have not let them grow soft and complacent in long years of peace.

RUSSIA AGAINST THE STRAITS

WHEN PETER THE GREAT ASCENDED THE THRONE of Moscow, some 250 years ago, his Russia had free access to only one open sea, and that was the Arctic Ocean, hardly a practical waterway for ships of that time. It was he who initiated the policy of "piercing a window" into the World. Ever since, Russian foreign policy has had as uppermost the desire to break out of a landlocked position into the free expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific communities. This resulted in Russia's quest for warm-water ports—warm-water ports in the Indian Ocean by a drive through Iran; on the China Sea by dominating Manchuria; and, most desirable goal of all, on the Mediterranean by forcing the Straits. For 200 years now Russia has stood at the entry of this waterway, with the blue Aegean beckoning across a paltry 175 miles or so of Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles; at times it even seemed that the great prize would be hers. Yet today she still stands on her side of the door, applying her shoulders vigorously to it, but still unable to budge the little man on the other side.

The little man has had help, of course, because it seemed so important to the world that he should not be overrun. Napoleon I, perhaps the first who spoke in the language of the geopoliticians of today, once said, "Russia asked for Constantinople; I could not give it to her. That is too valuable a key. He who controls it can rule the world." Great Britain and France always, Austria at times, have made sure that the Straits should not be included in the spoils of the periodic Russian victories over the Turks. Twice in the XIX Century it seemed as if the great powers would come too late. In 1832, when the troops of a rebellious vassal of the Sultan (Mohammed Ali of Egypt, founder of the present royal house of Egypt) invaded Anatolia, Russia forced her aid on Turkey. Russian troops occupied both sides of the Bosporus, stopped the invading Egyptians in their tracks. Then, years later, Russia exacted her pound of flesh: in the Treaty of Alliance of Unkiar-Skelessi (July, 1883) she traded a most unwelcome promise to defend Turkey against all comers for the closing of the Straits to other than Russian warships. The great powers, which had been taken unawares by the surprising Russian intervention on the side of Turkey, reacted vigorously. Strong pressure was put on the Tsar's government with the result that, eight years after Unkiar-Skelessi, Russia surrendered the prize she had won. The Straits Convention of 1841 closed that waterway to all warships. For the time being, Russia remained bottled up in the Black Sea.

A famous conversation, which occurred a few years later between Tsar Nicholas I and the British Ambassador to St Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, showed Russia's touching solicitude for the fate of Turkey. At the very least it showed a strong desire to make arrangements for the funeral and for the settling of the estate of a patient who was still alive and kicking. Said the Tsar, "We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man; it would be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us, especially before all the necessary arrangements were made." In his reply, Sir Hamilton expressed politely a refusal which not so long afterwards hardened into the thunder of British guns before Sevastopol, "It is the duty of the strong and generous man to help the sick and weak."

Forty-five years after Unkiar-Skelessi, the Russian Sisyphus almost reached the brow of the hill again with his boulder. After a victorious war, Russia, her troops at the gates of Constantinople, dictated to prostrate Turkey the Peace of San Stefano (March, 1878). It would have opened the Straits to the victors, apart from dismembering Turkey. That, the great powers were not prepared to tolerate. The Congress of Berlin was summoned for the same summer, and there Disraeli and Bismarck contrived to take away again that which Russia had gained by force of arms. Turkey remained in undisputed control of the precious Straits.

THE SOVIETS IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE TSARS

AT PRESENT (and until 1957), the navigation in the Straits is regulated by the Convention of Montreaux of 1936. In time of peace (or in a war in which Turkey is neutral) merchant ships enjoy free passage. As to warships, the Black Sea powers (Soviet Union, Rumania, Bulgaria) can use the Straits in daytime and after notification of the Turkish authorities without restriction of type and tonnage (except

Istanbul's harbor lies serene beneath the guns of the battleship *USS Missouri*
Wide World Photo



Gen Tahsin Yazici (extreme right), CG of Turkish troops in Korea, and staff

that men-of-war of more than 15,000 tons displacement may pass only singly with no more than two escorts); all other powers are restricted as to type ("light surface vessels, small combat ships, and auxiliaries" only) and as to tonnage (a maximum of nine ships at a time, of a total displacement not greater than 15,000 tons). This, however, applies only to the passage of warships in time of peace. In war, the Straits are closed to the warships of the belligerents, with a few discretionary exceptions. There is a clause in the Montreaux Convention which makes possible its re-negotiation every five years. This provision gave an opening to the USSR for its latest attempt to force the Straits.

IT BEGAN WITH A WAR OF NERVES. At Yalta, Stalin told Roosevelt and Churchill, in a somewhat off-handed manner, that he wanted to see the Montreux Convention revised, but he did not elaborate and did not press the point. It thus came as a surprise when the Soviet Union let it be known in March 1945 that it did not intend to renew the Turko-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1925 which was to expire that year. After letting Turkey wonder for a while what this was all about, Russia handed Ankara a note in which she proclaimed her willingness to renew the treaty, but only under two conditions: that the border between Turkey and Soviet Trans-Caucasia be rectified in Russia's favor, and that the Montreux Convention be revised in conformity with Russian ideas. The latter condition Stalin revealed to his Allies in July 1945 during the famous Potsdam Conference (to which the Soviets never cease to harp back). Churchill told the story of what transpired there in a speech, given at a dinner in his honor in New York City, on March 15, 1946:

"At Potsdam the Americans and British offered to Russia a joint guarantee of the complete freedom of the Straits in peace and war, whether for merchant ships or ships of war. To this guarantee, I am convinced, Turkey would gladly have subscribed. But we were told that this was not enough. Russia must have a fortress inside the Straits from which she could dominate Constantinople. But, my friends, this is not to keep the Straits open but to give the power of closing them to a single nation."

What the Kremlin wanted was another Hangoe, a military base in the Straits which would command Constantinople and Turkey as Hangoe commands Helsinki and Finland. This was the more astounding in that Turkey was a war-time ally and a member country of the United Nations, not a defeated foe like Finland.

All through these diplomatic preliminaries, the big drums of Soviet propaganda beat a frantic tattoo. Fantastic territorial claims were made, not in the name of Russia, but of the so-called "autonomous" S.S.R.'s of Soviet Trans-Caucasia. For the Armenian S.S.R., the Red press and radio vociferously laid claim to the districts of Kars and Ardahan in Northeast Turkey, for the Georgian S.S.R. to a strip of territory along the Black Sea coast which included the cities of Erzerum and Trebizond. All in all, Russian demands amounted to more than 31,000 square miles, inhabited by more than 1,750,000 people. These demands were directed against a nation which had not only given no provocation, but had, in fact, been the first (in 1921) to conclude a treaty of friendship with the then hard-pressed Soviets;they were made in the most brutal form, and in a manner as preposterous as if Washington demanded the cession of Northern Mexico not to the United States, but to Texas. Russia's bare-faced extortions were the more omnious that they bore a striking resemblance to similar propaganda attacks against Finland in 1939—in that case, territorial demands were promptly followed by armed invasion.

MOSCOW MUST HAVE BEEN QUITE CERTAIN that the Turks would give in, because when the United States Secretary of State, James Byrnes, proposed a compromise (the Straits to be virtually closed to warships of non-Black Sea powers; the latter to have the right to pass warships freely through the Straits), the Soviets brushed it aside. This proved to be bad politics: the men in the Kremlin had failed to realize that these were no longer the balmy days of Yalta, that Western enthusiasm for, and deference to the wishes of the "gallant Russian ally" had waned. Turkey was encouraged by a forthright statement, made to the Commons on February 21, 1946, by Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, in which Great Britain

clearly rejected Soviet demands for bases in the Straits, and for a revision of the Montreux agreement, if such revision should lead to any change in Turkish sovereignty over the waterway, or to any infringement upon the principle that the navigation through the Straits was an international question, not one reserved to the littoral powers of the Black Sea. Bevin's, "I do not want Turkey converted into a satellite state," summed up the British position. That is was also the position of the United States was documented by the visit of the USS *Missouri* to Constantinople at a time when the crisis was mounting toward its climax.

The Russian ultimatum, in fact if not in form, was contained in identical notes which were handed to Turkey, the United States, and Great Britain on August 7, 1946. In them, Moscow demanded a revision of the Montreux agreement under five headings. The first three were more or less identical with the Byrnes' proposals of the previous year, and were promptly accepted as a basis for negotiation by the United States, while Turkey, more guardedly, signified her willingness to submit them to a conference of the signatories of the Montreux agreement. Point four contained the demand that the Straits convention be renegotiated in the future only by the Black Sea powers—this was to ask the Turks to submit to future Moscow dictates, as Rumania and Bulgaria could hardly be expected to side with Turkey against their Russian masters. This point was rejected by all the three addressees of the Russian note. The last heading concealed in diplomatic verbiage the Soviet determination to occupy the Straits militarily, "Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested in, and capable of, ensuring the freedom of merchant shipping and security in the Straits, to organize by joint means the defense of the Straits in order to prevent their use by other states for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers." This demand was also sharply rejected, by Turkey with the explanation that acceptance of Point Five would be tantamount to ". . . building up the so-called security of the Black Sea powers on the annihilation of Turkey's security." To that Moscow bluntly replied that the interest of the USSR in securing her more than 1,300 miles of Black Sea coastline (which nobody was threatening) overrode all other considerations, including Turkey's fear for its sovereignty.



In the fall of 1946, the situation had become critical. Turkey, faced with open Russian threats, stood to arms. Against the overwhelming might of the battle-tested and well-equipped Soviet armies she could rely only on her comparatively small forces armed with outdated weapons; on the advice of Great Britain to stand firm; and on the late Mr Forrestal's (then Secretary of the Navy) warning, obviously addressed to Moscow, that the U.S. Navy was in the Mediterranean "to protect United States interests and support United States policies in the area." There was some more Russian sabre-rattling. But when Turkey boldly told her mighty Northern neighbor that she considered as closed the subject of a revision of the Straits agreement on Russia's terms, and when the protective wing of the Truman Doctrine was extended over little Turkey ("The future of Turkey as an independent . . . state is clearly no less important . . . than the future of Greece"), the tension subsided. The little man behind the closed doors of the Straits had not budged; the would-be invader of the little man's privacy withdrew for a while to catch his breath.

A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

MOSCOW HAS NOT GIVEN UP, but neither has she succeeded as far as her intentions toward Turkey are concerned. Turkish guns still dominate the Straits; the Montreaux Convention is still in force, unrevised; not an inch of Turkish soil along the frontier with Soviet Trans-Caucasia has been yielded. A Western people, viewing this cheery situation, may grow complacent, but not the Turks. For them the present is very much like the oppressive calm before a typhoon. They are doing what a prudent ship's crew does in such a situation: they inspect their ship for structural weakness; they batten down the hatches; they brace themselves physically and morally for the onslaught.

Wide World Photo

Stalin's demand for Red bases in the Straits was flatly rejected at Potsdam

The Turks are probably better equipped today to counter the next Russian move than at any time in the last two stormy centuries of Russo-Turkish relations. United States military and economic aid has done wonders in making the Turkish armed forces a modern instrument of war, and in starting the country on the way toward a reasonable degree of industrialization. Turkey's greatest asset is her internal strength. She is a country which is unique in modern times in that it has been consolidated, secured, and re-organized by as tough and ruthless a dictatorship as any imposed on a nation, and then has made its transition to democracy smoothly, and without retaliation against the representatives of the dictatorial regime. The first dictator, Kemal Atatürk, remains Turkey's national hero, and the opposition party which swept Kemal's Populists from power, calls itself proudly "Kemalist." Kemal's successor, General Inonü, is respected as one of the successful military leaders of the Greco-Turkish War; he lives in honorable retirement. Celal Bayar, president of Turkey and leader of the victorious Democratic Party, once was a cabinet minister under Kemal, and never ceases to proclaim his devotion to the memory of Turkey's great man. Yet, the Turks are free today, as free as any democratic people of the West. With the personal freedom thus newly gained they have inherited, from twenty seven years of dictatorship, an orderly and strong country. Whatever one may think of the evils of dictatorial rule, Kemal Atatürk's brand of it has lifted Turkey from the depth of economic and political chaos to its present unity and efficiency. It has climaxed this achievement by allowing democracy to take over, once the work of reconstruction was done.

Communism has practically no hold in Turkey. The party is outlawed; its leader, Sefik Husnu, spends his days in and out of jail; there are an estimated 5,000 secret party members, recruited mostly from the ranks of disgruntled intellectuals and Istanbul university students. The potential value to Russia of the Turkish Communist Party as a fifth column in time of war is very small. Much more dangerous are the national minorities of northeast Turkey, the Armenians and the Kurds. Religion (the Armenians are Christians; the Kurds are modified Shiah Moslems, while the Turks are Sunnites) has ceased to be a motive for discontent, since Kemal Atatürk converted Turkey from a theocratic state to one in which state and church are separated, but the memories of ruthless suppression of Kurdish and Armenian national aspirations, suppression which usually took the form of massacre, still rankle. Through radio and press, and through agents infiltrated across the border, the Soviet Union is trying to keep the flame of rebellion alive among Turkey's Kurds and Armenians. The former seem to be fairly contented now, they have not risen for the last 17 years which is a remarkable period of peace for this wild and proud people. The Armenians are a more difficult proposition. Across the border, in Soviet Trans-Caucasia, there is the Armenian S.S.R., a feeble substitute for the free Armenia promised in Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points," but at least a territory which for almost thirty years now has borne the name of Armenia. There is probably little pro-Soviet feeling among Turkey's Armenians, who are mostly artisans and traders and who showed their preference after WW I when they wanted to make their country a protectorate of the United States, but many, if not the great majority, of them are frankly anti-Turkish. It remains to be seen whether they can be wooed by the new economic liberalism and political freedom which the elections of 1950 brought to Turkey.

The Turk is wont to begin a sentence with an "Inshallah," which can be loosely translated as, "if it be God's will." It is the pious expression of what, basically, is his Moslem surrender to Fate. This makes him view the recurrent Russian drives for Constantinople and the Straits with equanimity, they are a burden of course, but it has always been and it will always be so. The geopolitician may call it the categorical imperative of Turkey's geographic position; the simple Turk calls it his nation's destiny. He has always faced up to it bravely. He does so today, as he stands guard stolidly in Eastern Thrace and on the borders of Soviet Trans-Caucasia, and as he bars the Straits, Russia's coveted gateway to the Mediterranean.

USMC

Switchboard for Sound Waves



By Capt Cyril D. Jeffcoat

COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE MODERN MARINE Corps have been likened to the relationship of some men's wives to their husbands—something they can't live with, but something they can't live without. Similarly, good communication is necessary if the mission is to be successful.

Recent years have witnessed tremendous advancement in methods and speeds of transportation and maneuverability of troops and weapons. "Air lift" has become



an everyday phrase. These rapid advancements have increased the tempo of modern warfare and imposed new requirements on every available means of communications. In most respects, new and revised communication developments and techniques have kept pace with these requirements. Some of them place a heavy load on our source of man-power, particularly in combat. Lower echelons of command use a staggering amount of communication equipment, materials, and manpower in order to "maintain communication." The old reliable telephone system consumes a heavy toll of wire and manpower in its installation. Hazards of combat make it very difficult to keep the wires in service and, when trouble develops on the lines, repairs to field wires are slow and also hazardous.

In an effort to relieve the difficulty of installing and maintaining good telephone communications under combat conditions, a revolutionary multi-channel radio-relay communication system was introduced to the Marine Corps in 1944. Tried very successfully on Okinawa, it was again used to great advantage in occupation duty in Japan and China. Action in Korea has once again accented the advantages of this system.

Multi-channel radio-relay communication systems have been accepted very enthusiastically by Marine Corps field commanders. However, general knowledge of their characteristics, capabilities, and limitations among line and staff officers is not too widespread. This article will

Heart of the system—a receiver and transmitter



Teletypes and telephone work simultaneously



attempt to present precisely what the multi-channel radio-relay system is, what it can do, and what it cannot do.

The present multi-channel radio-relay system being employed by the Marine Corps consists of a number of radio transmitters and receivers which are connected into ordinary telephone and teletype switchboards. The radio-relay circuits connect the two switchboards much like the ordinary metallic telephone trunk circuits. Thus, the radio-relay system brings the radio set as close as the nearest telephone and makes the familiar telephone the mouth-and-ear-piece of the radio circuit.

Its operation is very simple. The switchboard operator receives a call from any local telephone, plugs the line cord into the desired radio-telephone circuit and rings. The operator's ringing current causes the corresponding circuit shutter to fall at the called switchboard. There, the switchboard operator answers and asks, "Number, please," and rings the desired local telephone. This procedure is exactly like any other straight-metallic long-distance telephone call. The two parties converse in precisely the same manner as if they were using an ordinary telephone circuit. As a matter of fact, in more applications, the radio-relay system is rapidly becoming an ordinary telephone circuit, the only difference being that the electrical voice currents are traveling through the air instead of along the conventional twisted pair of metallic wires.

In effect, the radio-relay system is replacing long and laboriously-installed telephone lines. This is of vital importance when telephone systems must be rapidly installed and when, as in amphibious operations, entire telephone systems must be constantly moved from place to place and hastily reinstalled. The field-wire method of establishing and moving telephone systems is expensive, laborious, and sometimes requires a sacrifice of communications standards. And, once they are installed, their maintenance, particularly of long lines, is slow, tedious, and highly inefficient. On the other hand, radio-relay system maintenance is confined to certain well-defined spots where repairmen are readily available. The radio-relay system is not only easier to install and maintain than long telephone wire lines, but also requires only a small fraction of the time and equipment necessary to install or move lines. Thus, it saves tremendous amounts of material, manpower, shipping space, and precious time in initial and subsequent installations.

Radio-relay systems derive their name from their peculiar characteristic of automatically receiving and retransmitting signals in the desired direction whenever it is necessary to extend the length of the circuit beyond the distance capabilities of the single set. When two switchboards are to be located 50 or 60 miles apart and are to be connected by radio-relay, a radio-relay station is installed approximately mid-way between the two switchboards to receive and retransmit signals automatically from one switchboard to the other.

For purposes of explanation, let us call the equipment at each switchboard a "radio terminal set" and the relaying equipment a "radio relay set." The reliable range between present radio terminal sets is dependent on a number of variable factors, all of which may be predicted with reasonable accuracy for any specific span.

Radio-relay stations are used to extend the operating range between terminal stations up to distances of 150 miles. Each radio-relay station consists of two continuously-operated receiver-transmitter combinations. Each component operates on a different, non-interfering frequency. One receiver-transmitter combination is used to receive and retransmit signals for one direction, while the other combination is used to receive and retransmit signals in the opposite direction. Thus, a signal from terminal station "A" is received and retransmitted instantly and automatically by each relay station in the circuit until it is received at terminal station "B", and vice-versa. It might appear to the uninitiated that this relaying of the signals would tend to slow them down and cause "echo," but such is not the case. These signals still travel, despite the number of relays, at the constant rate of 186,273 miles per second, which is quite rapid. It is by means of these relay stations that the original signal is carried far beyond the normal range of one radio-terminal set.

Since the present radio equipment is frequency-modulated and operates in the very high frequency band, noise in the circuits is kept to a minimum and the signal may be amplified to become very loud with respect to the noise. Thus, it possesses what radiomen call a high "signal-to-noise" ratio. Unfortunately, however, any radio circuit adds some noise to the signal and, as a result there is a limit to the number of such circuits that can be connected in tandem. Hence, there is a limit to the number of radio-relay stations which may be used in the extension of overall circuit distance. Usually, as many as five may be used without material reduction of the signal-to-noise ratio. As many as nine relay stations have been known to give satisfactory results.

Among the unique features of this radio-relay equipment is its uncanny and amazing characteristic of handling several conversations or teletypewriter signals simultaneously. This is called its multi-channel characteristic. To most people, this amazing capability appears little short of an impossibility, but it is, nevertheless, true. Each receiver and transmitter set provides four telephone circuits which permit four independent telephone conversations to be conducted over it simultaneously with complete privacy. This is accomplished by ingenious



A jury-rigged version in Korea

electronic barriers acting much the same as the familiar traffic island which channels traffic into pre-determined portions of a highway. Hence, each of the four telephone circuits becomes a "channel" within the radio circuit.

Any one of these four telephone channels may be disconnected from the telephone system and used to provide teletypewriter circuits or channels. When used for teletype, one telephone channel will provide four two-way teletypewriter channels.

In order to employ the radio-relay system properly, it is necessary to understand its limits. The main limiting factor is its relatively short transmission range. Radio transmission and reception are influenced by such factors as transmission characteristics of the radio frequency on which the set is designed to operate, power output of the radio transmitter, radiation efficiency of transmitting and receiving antennas, and factors of nature itself. Factors of nature which influence radio transmission and reception composition of terrain over which transmission is desired, electrostatic conditions of the atmosphere, weather, season, time, and others.

Considering the foregoing factors, the present radio-relay equipment is reliable over average terrain for 20 to 35 miles between stations. Using the more conservative 20-mile figure, 100 miles of multi-channel radio-relay circuit may be established by the use of four relay stations along the route. Or, with more favorable conditions, only three relay stations spaced 25 miles apart might be sufficient. In either event, eight man-days' labor would accomplish the installation, and the circuits would be ready for use in less than two hours from the time personnel and equipment arrived on location! More than 1300 man-days' labor would be required to install equivalent, conventional, open-wire circuits and there is no telling how long it would be before they would be ready for use. It is left for the reader to decide which of the two installations could be more readily moved and reinstalled.

It should be pointed out here, too, that large bodies of water represent a far less formidable task to the radio-relay system than they would to conventional wire systems. The two systems can be used together, however, to span water or impassable terrain. Salt water, incidentally, is one of the best known radio-transmission paths.

Radio-relay equipment itself is not very large or heavy. The transmitter and receiver with classroom antennas together weigh less than 110 pounds, and, as can be seen, the transmitter is about half the size of a regulation foot-locker and the receiver is even smaller. However, its component and spare parts add greatly to the over-all weight. A carrying case weighs 40 pounds. Each is provided with an antenna which weighs 470 pounds. Together they must have a continuous 110-volt, alternating current power supply. And, if the power supply is to run continuously, more than one must be provided. Each of the two power supplies weighs 425 pounds. If good service is to be expected, an adequate supply of spare components, spare parts, and test instruments must be kept on hand at each station. A reasonable supply of spares weighs 600 pounds. A few more odds and ends and the total weight of a radio relay or radio terminal station has reached the staggering sum of 2770 pounds, a load which only a 6 x 6 truck can carry. Our 100-mile system requires five or six huge trucks for transportation.

It is not difficut to see that the size and weight of the present equipment, together with all its components and spares, represents its most serious employment handicap; particularly for front-line use. In this respect, it is in serious need of redesign and streamlining, with a view toward lightening its weight and reducing its size in order that it can be employed between all echelons of command within an amphibious operation. Once this is accomplished, and it can be, it is destined to become one of the most valuable pieces of equipment a military commander can have. It lends itself ideally to ship-to-shore communication. It is also ideally suited for communication between ships at relatively short distances, such as in a convoy or rendevous. Redesigned, the radio relay set will become more readily transported, by helicopter for instance, for installation atop high mountain peaks where its line-of-sight transmission characteristic can be used to better advantage.

When it has been redesigned to the point where it can be installed out of sight in a jeep, then—and not until then—we can truly refer to the Old Man's jeep as a "Command Jeep." USMC

FIREPOWER and

FINAL INSTALLMENT

WHAT KIND OF FIRE POWER WILL WE NEED TO SUPport the amphibious operation of WW III? We know that we must be prepared to execute anything from a small raid to the assault of a strongly held beach—the amphibious counterpart of the attack of a fortified position in land warfare—and that the support must measure up to either of these widely divergent types of operation. We already have concluded that we must employ the available firepower more efficiently and to better purpose than we did in the past. What improvements then are necessary to accomplish this more effective employment?

We can realistically evaluate our fire power if we subject it to the greatest test that it might be called on to face—that of supporting an amphibious assault against a strongly fortified beach position located on a land mass with well developed communications; against an enemy with large, mobile, well-balanced forces, thus calling for the retention of tactical surprise. If our potential in fire power can meet this test, it certainly should be able to measure up to any less difficult operation. Accordingly, then, this analysis will consider the assault of a fortified landing beach, backed by mobile reserves, capable of rapid movement to meet the amphibious attack. In general terms, we could summarize our fire power requirements as follows:

a. Fire power capable of destroying or neutralizing fixed positions commanding the landing beaches and helicopter landing areas.

b. Support capable of destroying or neutralizing field artillery, antiaircraft, rocket launchers and mortars bearing on the landing beaches and helicopter drop areas.

c. Support capable of isolating the landing areas and drop zones, thus preventing concentration of enemy reserves.

In the destruction of fixed positions commanding the landing beaches, we can fall back on the experience of WW II. As a result of Tarawa, the Navy and Marine Corps learned that the destruction of these defenses required heavy caliber fire from short range and at slow ship speed in order to utilize the pin-point accuracy of the heavy rifles. This time consuming procedure was practical in the Central Pacific where speed was relatively non-essential (although there was always more destruction that could have been done) and the enemies capability for interfering with these operations was limited. Can it be effective when tactical surprise is required, thus sharply limiting the time such destructive fires can be executed to one or two hours before the landing? Where the danger of atomic attack will limit the concentration of heavy ships off the landing beaches? Our experience in destroying defenses of a well organized landing beach such as those encountered in the Central Pacific, or at Omaha Beach in Normandy, forces the conclusion that ships alone cannot accomplish this important task—even if we grant the possibility that a heavy ship might simultaneously engage as many targets as she had major caliber turrets, thus achieving a marked improvement over the destructive techniques realized in the Central Pacific against beach defenses. If we are

the amphibious assault

to count on the destruction of the majority of defenses on a highly organized beach, we must get fire support assistance from sources other than naval gunfire.

Fortunately, this does not appear to be impossible. Additional sources for assistance in this destruction are the airplane, and possibly an improved, armored LVT. In addition, the possibility of employing helicopter borne troops to take out defenses from the flanks and rear has merit. Considering the airplane first—its characteristics of range and mobility give it considerable advantage over the support ship, permitting attacks to be launched against the defenses from relatively distant bases, either afloat or ashore. Accordingly, aircraft can be employed prior to the selected D-day without loss of tactical surprise, provided that similar attacks are directed against other possible landing areas.

BUT HOW ABOUT THE ABILITY of the airplane to hit and destroy a beach blockhouse? We can rule out the bomb dropped from the airplane in level flight, for both the theoretical laws of probability and the experience of WW II have exploded the myth of "pickle barrel" accuracy. It just ain't there. But a diving aircraft, guided by a trained pilot, has a reasonable chance of hitting with a rocket; it should not require an unreasonable number of such dives to insure a single hit. Since defenses of the blockhouse type are almost invariably sited to deliver flanking fire along the landing beach rather than directly to seaward, the airplane has another advantage over the ship in that the direction of aircraft attack can be delivered against the target aperture. On the other hand, the ship is limited to its direction of attack and, consequently, is often required to blow away protective earth before the projectile can reach the blockhouse wall and penetrate it. As for the penetrative capabilities of aircraft rockets, the Tiny Tim or similar rocket types should be able to deal with the average, reinforced concrete wall.

Finally, the use of the improved LVT may have some promise in assisting in the destruction. In such a case, the LVT would need to seek a firing position from which the aperture of the defense could be seen and attacked with the stabilized gun. It might be a bit rough on the LVT, but the low silhouette, combined with limited mobility, should take it out of the category of a sitting duck. Such a method, while unorthodox, cannot be ruled out—it may have real possibilities, and we will say more about these possibilities later.

But the question might well be asked—why do we attempt to destroy beach defenses? Would it not be sufficient to neutralize these installations during the ship-to-shore movement and until such time as our troops could close with the defenses and put them out of action? Such a procedure might be effective against those defenses without overhead cover—where the enemy could be driven from his weapons and forced to take overhead cover. However, when a determined enemy has the protection of a solid overhead, our Pacific experience has shown that it is almost impossible to stop him from firing his weapons. But even assuming that neutralization fires would be sufficient to cover the ship-to-shore movement, it is still necessary to lift fires from the immediate beach defenses just prior to the landing of our troops. We continually attempted to reduce to the minimum the time interval between the lifting of fires and the landing of troops. As the experience of naval gunfire support units increased, (and as the landing force gained confidence in the ability of the support units) this interval was reduced from about five minutes to the neighborhood of three—a matter of about 300-500 yards. Unfortunately, even in such a short interval of time, some intact beach defenses were able to get into effective action with re-

By Col Donald M. Weller

sultant casualties to our troops. But, more important, the fire of beach defense weapons confined the early attack to a relatively small strip of beach. By concentrating fires in this restricted bit of real estate, the hostile curved fire weapons: the artillery, mortar, and rockets had a chance for a field day. While small units—squads, platoons and perhaps companies—were trying to get an attack organized to take out these beach defenses which were in action, the mortars and artillery went to work. It doesn't need too much in the way of imagination to picture the havoc that proximity-fuzed artillery projectiles could produce in this situation. The Japs didn't have this lethal little device and yet they did pretty well without it, and without modern artillery techniques and methods. I think that we can conclude that it is necessary to continue our attempts to destroy the maximum number of beach defenses within the interval of time allowed for preservation of tactical surprise.

MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE of the effectiveness of neutralization fires—how they could be generally depended upon to cover the ship-to-shore movement within a few hundred yards of the beaches (although the siting of the beach defense had a considerable bearing on this). At any rate a situation somewhat like the following too often occurred. The assault elements of a battalion landing team approached the beach with negligible casualties. When a few hundred yards off, naval gunfire lifted from the immediate beach defenses on the landing beach and moved inland several hundred yards—aircraft then attacked, covering the area just vacated by naval gunfire by firing rockets and strafing. The troops reached the beach and disembarked under machine gun and cannon fire from some undetermined and unlocated defenses, while artillery and mortar fire added to the noisy and dangerous confusion. Riflemen took what cover was offered and attempted to locate the sources of the fire. Before the attack had been fairly launched, it had been stopped—stopped until the defenses holding up the advance could be located and eliminated by a series of more or less uncoordinated small unit maneuvers. Where was the fire support? A good question. The naval gunfire ships had lifted their fires ahead of the troops in accordance with the schedule of fires which they would continue to follow until the spotter of the Shore Fire Control Party designated a target of opportunity. Similarly, close support aircraft could not attack unless requested by the Tactical Air Control Party. So, although the fire support was there, no contribution was being made toward the elimination of defenses.

What were the reasons for this failure? There were several. Difficulty of target identification; casualties to Shore Fire Control and Tactical Air Control Parties and their equipment, the lack of information as to the position of our own troops or the close proximity of the assault troops to the enemy defenses—all these played a part in nullifying fire support during this critical phase. The problem of target identification was particularly difficult. Targets might be seen by literally dozens of assault troops, but until the Shore Fire Control Party located them, the direct support ship could not be put on the targets (lying prone on the beach under fire is not exactly the best vantage point for locating indistinct defenses).

Perhaps the target was pointed out to the spotter or he himself located it but, due to his lack of knowledge as to where his own troops were, he did not call for fire for fear of shooting up his own people. Perhaps he did know where his own people were but the target was too close for safety—so he didn't do anything. Perhaps the gunfire liaison officer, afloat off the beach, might see the defense from his vantage point—he usually had better observation and more reliable radio communication than the spotter. If he could be sure of the position of his own people, he could call for the fires from his own direct support ship. But again, like the spotter, perhaps he couldn't definitely fix the location of the front lines, or he believed the target to be too close for comfort. The naval gunfire air spotter, available in the later Pacific operations, wasn't much help in this situation either, for the targets were usually too small and consequently too difficult to locate from the air.

Similarly, the Tactical Air Control Party had the same problems of identification of target and of own lines which plagued the Shore Fire Control Party. In addition, the tactical air control officer was competing with quite a few other calls for the available close support aircraft.

As a result, just when the assault riflemen needed fire support the most, our system often broke down com-

"Where's the fire support?"



Helicopter-borne troops could take key points inland

pletely — and the more difficult the assault, the more this was likely to occur. The elimination of the beach defenses had to be done the hard, slow, and expensive way by small unit maneuvers with resultant heavy casualties. This problem was never solved in WW II, nor is there any tangible reason to believe that we have a better solution today.

But there may be some method of improvement—some solution to insure the kind of timely fire support required. Plainly a more reliable and universal system of target designation is required—a system, which may have some merit, is proposed as follows:

Provide each rifle squad, Shore Fire Control, and Tactical Air Control Party with a distinctive tracer bullet or a special colored rifle smoke grenade for target designation. Then, instead of one or two spotters on a battalion beach, there would be a great many. This should go a long way toward insuring detection of the defenses hazarding the advance.

But merely marking a target with tracers or colored smoke grenades is not enough. A fire support unit must be capable of maneuvering close enough to the beach to actually see the targets identified by the markers, and to locate the forward assault elements in the vicinity of the target. Finally, the fire support unit would have to mount a weapon with sufficient accuracy to hit the apertures of a blockhouse and sufficient power to deal with the walls of a lightly constructed defense. Would such a fire support unit be of any assistance in springing the assault troops across the beach? There doesn't seem to be much argument.

But is there such a fire support device? What sort of characteristics should such a firing unit possess? Shallow draft, certainly, in order to close in on the beach within a few hundred yards; excellent visibility for the naked eye, supplemented and assisted by telescopic vision for close examination of target and troop location: a stabilized sight and gun for accurate laying and precise firing against a target as small as a blockhouse aperture, firing that may well have to pass only a few feet above the heads of prone riflemen on the beach; a projectile heavy enough to carry a respectable bursting charge and to give sufficient weight for penetration of light armor or concrete; and, finally, a low silhouette to reduce the target presented, as well as armor for protection of the crew.

These characteristics immediately rule out all the conventional fire support units with which we are already familiar. Neither the destroyer nor the LSMR, or even the LCSL (gunboat) have a sufficiently shallow draft to permit the close approach to the beach that would be required; and yet the LCSL is about the smallest ship that could be expected to negotiate the sea and reach the objective under its own power. Therefore, this theoretical support craft must have the additional characteristic of permitting it to be carried in a larger vessel and launched at the objectve area.

IT WOULD APPEAR that the armored amphibian tractor comes closer to this theoretical fire support unit than anything in being today. The WW II version of the LVTA has the majority of the enumerated characteristics, with the possible exception of sufficient visibility, for ease of target designation, and sufficient muzzle velocity to insure accuracy and penetration. It would appear to be reasonable that improved visibility and increased muzzle velocity could be built into the LVTA without losing the other required characteristics of shallow draft, stabilized sight and gun, as well as low silhouette. Such a fire support unit could do much to fill the gap in our fire support.

There is another benefit which would be forthcoming if we are able to harness the LVTA to the task of assisting the assault in crossing the beach—that advantage is the integrated training of assault troops with the supporting weapon. We were unable to do this in WW II because the gunfire ships and the aircraft could not be



Develop LVTA firepower to assist the assault across the beaches

spared from other combat assignments for the training. However, since such LVTA units would be organic to the landing force, ample opportunity for combined training in the assault of beach defenses would be possible—thus permitting specific techniques to be developed by LVTA and rifle units in concert.

Nor would this additional fire support replace or compete with the naval gunfire, air, tanks, or artillery. Its major employment would be to fill the gap between the lifting of naval gunfire and air support, and the breaching of the beach defenses by the assault. We would still strive for the earliest possible landing of tanks and artillery that the tactical situation would permit. If successful, the employment of the LVTA in this manner might prevent the beach stalemate that can and has developed—the stalemate that has caused so many casualties; and thus would permit increased speed in the amphibious attack. It seems worth trying.

V

WE HARDLY NEED THE TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL records for the past war to realize that the majority of casualties in the amphibious operation was caused by the curved-fire weapons—the mortars, rockets, and field artillery, with some assistance from antiaircraft. Central Pacific experience with these weapons during the early phases of an amphibious assault really began with the Mariannas and continued, with an ever increasing tempo, through Pelilieu and Iwo Jima, finally culminating at Okinawa. Of these three weapons, the mortar was our prime enemy, not only during the fight to clear the beaches, but continuing to the very end.

Destruction of these curved-fire weapons during preliminary operations is most difficult to evaluate. We were never given the opportunity to find out just what weapons had been destroyed by our pre D-day efforts, for by the time our troops had overrun the weapon positions, the positions had been subjected to additional fire from our own artillery and mortars, as well as air and naval gunfire attack. However, we can draw the tentative conclusion that we were *not* successful in destroying significant numbers of these curved-fire weapons during the pre-D day phase. Several reasons seem to support such a conclusion. First, the artillery was almost invariably located in expertly camouflaged and covered positions which afforded excellent protection from all but a direct hit from a heavy projectile, bomb, or rocket; second, these positions were usually located several thousand yards from the shore line and were not susceptible to direct fire from the naval gun; and third, the elimination of coastal defense and antiaircraft, combined with the destruction of beach defenses, received a higher priority. The destruction of mortars and rocket launchers was even more difficult due to their small size, ease of emplacement, and the extreme difficulty of locating and then hitting such targets.

There was one possible exception to this grave conclusion of ineffectiveness again curved-fire weapons. Where weapons were located in open emplacements (all AAA and some FA) we did achieve a substantial measure of success, particularly with aircraft attack—but field artillery was seldom so encountered, the Japanese choosing rather to sacrifice the wide fields of fire and resultant flexibility in order to gain overhead protection.

But regardless of our lack of success in destroying curved-fire weapons during the preliminary phases, we did succeed in smothering the majority of these weapons on D-day during the ship-to-shore movement and for a short period after H-hour, this period differing for the various Central Pacific operations. I can almost hear the vehement exceptions of Saipan veterans to this statement and I will hasten to add that at Saipan field artillery and mortars were certainly not neutralized during the ship-to-shore movement and after the troops had hit the beach. But the primary failure at Saipan was one of intelligence in that the same 50-odd field artillery pieces located inland from the beaches were not suspected prior to the assault, nor did the planner recognize the need for placing some scheduled naval gunfire on this area on suspicion that it was a very likely position for Jap artillery. In any case, the result was probably the heaviest D-day casualties in the Central Pacific war, but it must be primarily attributed to the failure of intelligence and planning—not in the means of neutralizing the artillery. In other operations, the short period of neutralization

of artillery, mortars, and rockets was achieved by tremendous concentration of naval gunfire placed on known and curved-fire positions. But, invariably, considerations of ammunition availability forced the volume of fire to be reduced after H-hour. The Japanese manned those weapons that had escaped damage—and heavy casualties resulted. One important byproduct of this heavy neutralization fire is worthy of mention, i.e., the destruction of wire communications connecting artillery positions with such fire direction and control centers as the Japanese had organized, and POWs reported that the destruction of these communications often prevented the flexible employment of available artillery. Many of us recall artillery and mortar fire falling in considerable density on some points of the landing beach, while other portions were unmolested. This was due to the fact that the Jap mortars and artillery were laid on fixed barrages which could not be altered due to a lack of effective communications. Against an enemy that stresses flexible employment of massed fire, destruction of communications and control centers is certainly an important offshoot of neutralization fires.

ACROSS THE WORLD in the Normandy landings, the German artillery threat to our forces was a substantial one. Over 85 pieces of artillery of all calibers were known to command Utah beach, while a somewhat lesser number threatened Omaha Beach. Much of this artillery, particularly the heavier calibers, was located in strongly protected concrete emplacements with overhead cover. Some destruction of this artillery was attempted by medium and heavy bomber attacks, on D-1 and on the night of D-day. However, this destructive effort was relatively minor and little damage resulted. As a result, the task of neutralization of this artillery threat fell to the eleven heavy ships of the gunfire support force, utilizing air spot by fighter type aircraft based in England. Fortunately, the success of this gunfire support force in counterbattery exceeded all expectation, and although the potentialities of artillery fire on Utah beach constituted a serious menace, it did not develop. This was not so much due to the actual destruction accomplished, but to the severing of communications between individual guns and their control centers, thus depriving batteries of effective direction. Again, as in the Central Pacific, the mortars were not brought under control, and these weapons took a heavy toll of the assault.

What sort of artillery opposition can we expect in WW III? Will the threat be more serious than that which we faced in the past amphibious operations? If we look at the organization, armament, and doctrine of our potential enemies, we are forced to conclude that this danger will be greater than ever before. We can expect to face more artillery; to face a rocket development possibly more advanced than our own; to encounter more and larger mortars; and that the capabilities of all these weapons will be sharply increased by the lethal proximity fuze. While we are told that there is a lack of flexibility in the doctrine of employment of these curved-fire weapons, training can be expected to correct this deficiency. Finally, we know that expert camouflage and the ability to construct effective fortifications rivals that of the Japanese. Plainly, then, we must be prepared for serious opposition in this field.

What improvements are needed in our technique and weapons to combat this threat? With tactical surprise a requirement in the majority of amphibious operations, it seems clear that the airplane is going to be forced to assume the majority of the burden of such destruction of defenses and weapons as may be accomplished prior to D-day. Even in D-day, the location of artillery at some distance from the shore line will make destructive aircraft attack more economical than that of ships' gunfire. Against the covered artillery position, the accuracy of low level rocket attack would seem to be indicated, while more latitude should be possible against the open artillery emplacement, utilizing a variety of aircraft weapons, including napalm. On the other hand, the neutralization of artillery on D-day can be more readily handled by ships gunfire, always provided that adequate air observation is available.

The smaller weapons, the mortars and rocket launchers, pose a greater threat. The small size of the weapons, combined with the ease with which they can be hidden and protected, make their destruction terrifically expensive, if not impossible—even if time were available for such a task. If destruction is ruled out, we must deal with these weapons by attempting to neutralize them. Our WW II method was to cover the entire area in which these weapons might be hidden with a heavy volume of naval gunfire, with the hope that such mortars and rocket launchers as might be located in the area would be abandoned by their crews. As previously noted this method had some measure of success during the heavy period of fire just prior to and a little after H-hour. Once the fire slackened the Japanese were emboldened to start firing (perhaps they never intended to shoot until our troops were ashore, anyway). At any rate, about all our troops knew was the fact that they were receiving mortar fire from *somewhere*. So Shore Fire Control Parties just picked a likely area up ahead and called for fire with the hope that this exploratory method might do some good. Similarly, air spotters could do little to assist in the process of mortar location. One could guess, without much fear of contradiction, that literally thousands of rounds of naval gunfire and artillery were fired in this exploratory and usually ineffective manner.

Plainly, the crux of the matter is that of mortar detection. If this problem is solved, then we should be able to place effective neutralizing fire on the weapon by means of the VT fuse. We do know that field artillery units now have instruments for mortar detection, which are having some success in locating the positions. We need to develop and thoroughly test similar but improved units for use aboard selected ships of an attack force. If such methods of detection prove to be practicable, techniques of employment should then be carefully worked out.

So far our appraisal of counterbattery has been confined to daylight operations on D-day. But what methods of fire support are available to take care of the neutralization of curved-fire weapons during darkness, particularly on the night of D-day to D+1. We can expect that the bulk of the division artillery should be in action by the night of D+1, and it is assumed that the organic field artillery should be able to handle the counter-mortar problem, with some assistance from battalion direct support ships. On the other hand, it is improbable that sufficient corps artillery will be ashore to handle the counterbattery problem against field artillery. Naval gunfire and air must continue to furnish substantial assistance in this field.

Our knowledge of the capabilities of naval gunfire support, forces the reluctant conclusion that a spotter is required somewhere—someone who can see the target and fall of shot, and transmit corrections so as to place the fire on the target. Normally, neither the spotter of the shore fire control party or one aboard a ship is so located so as to see field artillery positions. Consequently, air spotters are usually the only type that can be employed in counterbattery. These were employed during daylight during the past war, but were not available at night, except occasionally when land based aircraft were available. If gunfire support is to render assistance in counterbattery work, then aircraft spot must be available at night. Perhaps the development of all-weather aircraft will furnish the answer, provided that a sufficient number of this type of aircraft will be available to provide the necessary night naval gunfire spotters. However, the helicopters now carried by the heavy ships should be adapted to night spotting missions by the addition of the required instruments and by the requisite training of the pilots. Experimentation in this direction should certainly reveal whether or not it has merit.

Rocket ships may be one answer



But even the development of night spotting means will not completely solve the problem of effective night counter-battery from ships' guns. Weather conditions may reduce visibility to the point where no observation is possible or may be such that flight operations cannot be conducted. If gunfire is to participate in counterbattery under these conditions, the ability to deliver unobserved fires with sufficient accuracy to be effective must be developed. How can this be accomplished? In the main, this question is dependent upon the accuracy of establishing the ship's position with relation to the target. The use of radar beacons or reflectors located ashore, in positions whose map coordinates are known, may permit sufficient accuracy in fixing the ship's position. This, in turn, should permit the delivery of effective fire on a battery whose map coordinates are known. As a further refinement of such a method, it may be possible to tie the radar beacons or reflectors to the field artillery survey system, thus further expanding the capabilities of the naval gun for unobserved fires. These possibilities need thorough test and evaluation, and may produce favorable results.

As to the assistance that air can render in counterbattery at night, we know that relatively small numbers of aircraft were often able, by their very presence overhead, to seriously interfere with hostile artillery. There is little question, that when aircraft are available, they can make a major contribution toward the solution of night counterbattery. The question is, of course, the availability, and more will be said of this matter in the ensuing section.

At this point we might sum up our observations on the methods of dealing with the curved-fire weapons along the following lines:

1. That aircraft must assume the burden of pre-D

Neutralization fire didn't destroy this Tarawa blockhouse, but it cut communications

day and D-day destruction of field artillery and antiaircraft, while ships' gunfire must continue to provide for neutralization of artillery located in open emplacements on D-day.

2. The destruction of mortars and small rocket launchers is impractical, but that ships' gunfire, employing VT fuzed projectiles, continues to be the best method of neutralization of located weapons of this type.

3. The problem of early and rapid location of mortars requires the development of mortar detection units for mounting in ships of the attack force.

4. Counterbattery requirements during darkness will require the employment of all-weather aircraft for direct attacks, while effective counterbattery from ships' guns will require the development of helicopters or aircraft capable of night flight operations.

5. The use of radar beacons or reflectors located by map coordinates or tied to the artillery survey system may offer some promise in improving the capabilities of naval gunfire for unobserved fires. Such a method should be thoroughly developed and tested.

VI

MARINE CORPS VETERANS OF THE SHOESTRING operation at Guadalcanal need no reminder of the necessity of isolating the landing area. They were acutely aware of the necessity of preventing the Japanese from sending reinforcements via Tokyo Express down the Slot; and equally aware that we commanded neither the sea, nor the air. Even the ground routes leading to our perimeter could not be disputed with the 105mm artillery initially available. The Marines on Guadalcanal had to wait and take whatever force the Japs were able to hurl at them—with the profane hope that the naval surface and air forces would stop the stream of reinforcements; and the Solomon naval and air battles were fought for just such a purpose.

By the time the center of gravity of the amphibious attack shifted to the Central Pacific, our command of the sea and air at the objective prevented further interference from Japanese ground reinforcements—while the Battle of the Philippine Sea with the included "Marianas Turkey Shoot" marked the last serious attempt at sea-air interference in the Central Pacific, until the death struggle of the Japanese was evidenced by the suicidal Kamikazes. It is true that the ground defense forces on Saipan and Guam did utilize some small reserves to launch night counterattacks—but the failure of these attacks apparently convinced the Japanese that these tactics had to fail in the face of our overwhelming firepower—as a result

no major counterattacks were launched on Iwo Jima and relatively few on Okinawa—rather the Japanese adopted the method of attrition and delay which was so costly to our forces. It is true that the Kamikaze air counterattack was a serious threat to our naval forces, but, although heavy losses were inflicted, the fleet stayed, and the ground forces on Okinawa were not materially affected.

Mention has already been made of the characteristics of the amphibious attack in the Mediterranean and ETO where the major defenses were based on the rapid movement of reserves to seal off the amphibious attack. At Sicily and Salerno our command of the air was precarious—and all available landbased air effort had to be put to work to retain even this measure of control. As a consequence, the isolation of the landing area had to be placed, initially, in the lap of naval gunfire, until organic artillery and antitank weapons could be landed to take over this task. Consequently, at Sicily the counterattack by the German armor of the Herman Goering Division on D-day had to be met by the fires of cruisers *Boise* and *Savannah* with some direct fire from destroyers. Similarly, at Salerno the antitank fires from naval guns was a major element in repulsing the Nazi tanks.

In Normandy we had won the air battle prior to our invasion. As a consequence, a substantial portion of the Allied Tactical Air Force could be turned loose on the German reserves attempting to move in to oppose our landings. This air effort, with some assistance from naval gunfire, was successful in breaking the backbone of the German counterstroke. Even though the Nazi reinforcement capabilities exceed the potential Allied buildup ashore, the successful retention of tactical surprise, combined with effective isolation by the tactical air force, enabled our forces to make the landing stick.

WHAT SORT OF COUNTERSTROKE must we be prepared to meet in WW III? Will our resources in fire power be sufficient to blunt such an attack before it reaches our front lines? We know that our potential enemies are rapidly increasing their ground mobility by the incorporation of increased numbers of motor vehicles into their formations. We are also aware that we will have to counter large forces of tanks. Is our fire power adequate for such a task?

Our main weapon in this field is the airplane, and with this weapon we should be able to seriously disrupt the movement of enemy reserves during daylight hours, provided that sufficient planes are available to seize control of the air. However, what is to prevent hostile movement and counterattack during darkness, if only limited numbers of all-weather aircraft are available to operate in such a role? Is the carrier an unsuitable base for the conduct of night attacks in strength against the hostile reserves? Is the modification of the carrier-based day fighter or attack plane for night operations impossible, without making it an all-weather airplane? Finally, is the night flight operation of significant numbers of aircraft out of the question? If the answers to these questions indicate that nothing but all-weather aircraft can be relied on for isolation of the landing area, we are going to be badly off indeed.

As to the utility of ships' guns against hostile movement and counterattack during hours of daylight, we hardly need the testimony of General von Rundstedt to the effect that the naval gun was a major factor in hampering the German counterstroke at Normandy. The naval gun made a major contribution in this field in all theaters, while against German armor at Sicily and Salerno it uncovered hidden capabilities. But here again, the problems of technique closely resemble those for night counterbattery, namely, the need for a reliable means of night air spotting, as well as the improvement in technique required to deliver rapid and effective unobserved fires on the hostile counterattack. A tentative solution to the problem of night air spotting has been proposed—namely the adaption of the heavy ships helicopters for such purpose. The threat of hostile counterattack at night, particularly on D-day and D+1, before artillery is ashore in strength, point up the necessity for solution. In the event that weather conditions will not permit flight operations for spotting, rapid and reasonably accurate fires will be required. The test of accurately located radar beacons or reflectors has been suggested.

SUMMING UP:

1. We will get less fire support from ships in WW III; what we have must be more effectively employed.

2. When tactical surprise is required in order to seize a heavily-defended landing area, time for destruction of beach defenses will be limited and ships' guns cannot accomplish this task single-handed. Assistance from aircraft in the destruction of beach defenses and artillery will be required. In addition, an improved LVT may have some destruction capabilities. Tests of the feasibility of this method should be undertaken.

3. Destruction of mortars and small rocket launchers is impossible. Dependence will have to be placed in rapid detection by ship-based counter-mortar radar, together with prompt neutralization by the naval gun. A mortar detector unit must be developed, tested and mounted on selected ships of the attack force.

4. There is no solution for bridging the gap between the lifting of fires on the beaches and the passage of troops through the beach defenses. The development of a rapid visual method of target indentification, together with a suitable fire support unit which can maneuver close to the beach and be capable of rapid accurate fire against beach defenses, must be developed. Tracer and



Nazi beach defenses were elaborate and tough

rifle smoke grenades are proposed for a point of departure in developing such a means of target identification; while exploration and test of an improved and modified LVT for bridging the beach should be conducted.

5. A substantial majority of carrier-based aircraft must be capable of attack on hostile reserves as well as counterbattery during darkness.

6. There is no reliable means of night air spotting for naval gunfire. Improvement and modification of the helicopter is suggested.

7. The ability of ships' guns to deliver reasonably accurate, unobserved fires is not up to requirements. Use of radar beacons or reflectors located by map coordinates or tied to the artillery survey system is suggested.

This paper has been primarily concerned with the improvement of fire support for the amphibious operation. Certain problems have been posed, together with some possibilities for solution. Recognition of the problem is one thing; doing something about it is another. In the field of air support, Marine Corps aviation can be expected to press for solution of its problems in support-in the amphibious attack. The conclusions that are reached thereby can be disseminated to the naval carrier aircraft organization, so that the naval pilots can receive the benefit of realistic training in air support of the amphibious attack. Similarly, the artillerymen of the Marine Corps can press for solution of their vital fire support role.

IN THE FIELD OF NAVAL GUNFIRE no such relatively simple solution is possible. The ships are most certainly not under Marine Corps command nor are they concerned solely with the problem of naval gunfire support—the rocket ship is the only special naval gunfire ship. The remainder, the cruisers, and destroyers, are concerned with many other problems, mainly anti-submarine warfare, convoy escorts, anti-aircraft defense, and operations with the fast carriers. All of these are in themselves a specialty. Consequently, the advances in the technique of gunfire support must be brought to the front by the Marine Corps; a condition true in the past and still so today. The Marine Corps must continue to pose new gunfire support problems to the Navy for their solution. Where must such ideas come from? From the FMF units, from the headquarters of the Corps, from the officers in gunfire support assignments, be it on the naval amphibious staffs or in the gunfire support schools. Significant advances in gunfire techniques require realistic and forward-looking effort on the part of all these organizations and personnel. If such an impetus is to be furnished to this facet of the amphibious picture, we must recognize that the few officers required for such specialist duty must be adequately prepared for the assignment. It is not enough to simply pull an officer into such duty because he has been concerned with field artillery or anti-aircraft on the basic assumption that he knows about guns, that ships have guns, and therefore he knows about naval gunfire. An officer assigned to such duty without proper preparation will spend the majority of a two-year tour of duty learning his business with little resulting profit. No—there is a better way—and we should get on with it—a program starting with the young officer with basic artillery background, to which is added ship-based duty, followed by specific gunfire support schooling. Such a cycle would take time, but the Marine Corps is going to be in business for a long time.

It is quite easy, and, incidentally rather popular to depreciate the advance of any speciality of the military art as an attempt at "empire building." But it is submitted than when artillerymen, engineers, tankers, communicators, et al, stop trying to "build an empire," we had better look out. For the breath of life, of initiative, of improvement will have gone out of our organization.

USMC

Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

March Across the Pacific . . .

ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS, JUNE 1942 — APRIL 1944 — Samuel Eliot Morison, 369 pages, maps, photographs, diagrams, indexed. Boston: Atlantic—Little Brown. $6.00

Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls is volume VII of Samuel Eliot Morison's sweeping history of United States naval operations in WW II. With this fine work, the series, in its seafaring author's own phrase is "homeward bound;" volume VII is the midpoint of a projected 14.

For Marines, as for all amphibious students, the author has covered a period of tremendous interest: those high days from Tarawa through Eniwetok in which the V Amphibious Corps, supported and backed by the greatest fleet in history, commenced its march across the Central Pacific, which ended only on 22 September 1945, when the Corps commander broke his flag over Japanese Naval Headquarters, Sasebo.

And let it be said, without further parley, that the Morison treatment of these highly specialized battles—all removed from the deep blue water in which he has won such renown as seaman and historian—is admirable. He has compressed essential fact into amazingly short compass, and his judgments (at least to me) seem balanced and sound.

Inventory of "Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls" begins with an account of the recovery of the Western Aleutians, highlighted by the Battle of the Kommandorskis, a duelling sea-fight which might as well have taken place in 1914.

In some ways his handling of the Gilberts is the high point of the book, because it clears away, at one sweep, the accumulated historical doubts which cluttered the record of Tarawa and Makin.

Over and above its first-rate amphibious passages, the book deals with the elimination of Truk, with Pacific logistics, and in a special introduction by the gifted commander, James C. Shaw, with life in the fast carriers. This last is noteworthy not only for wealth of informative, authentic detail, but for Jim Shaw's style and for the opportunity which it affords Admiral Morison's ablest collaborator to appear in person on this history's broad stage.

As in any history, of course, there are things one would like changed or given different emphasis.

Despite the handsome compliments which the book pays to Marines and their Corps, I wish the author had not fallen for the military chestnut (diligently propagated in other services and expressed on p. 298) of Marine Corps and Army "differing tactics in land warfare." The fact is that Marine Corps tactics, both by regulation and fact, are prescribed right out of the Army field manuals and field service regulations—the very same ones which govern Army tactics. The difference, if a difference really exists, may lie in the variations in tactical interpretation.

Marine readers would also welcome exposition and treatment (other than the brief aside on p. 266) of the grave differences in troop/Navy amphibious command relations which manifested themselves from the Gilberts on in attempts to eliminate MajGen Holland Smith's headquarters from effective participation in or command of expeditionary troops during the Gilberts, Marshalls, and later campaigns. These were not frictional outcroppings of flintly personality, but vital debates which ultimately shaped today's amphibious command relations.

Adm Morison has turned in his usual able job. That he now holds rank of rear admiral (by virtue of combat retirement) seems most fitting for the American maritime historian who so nearly merits the ancient title of his biographical subject, Columbus: "Admiral of the Ocean Sea."

Reviewed by LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr.

Clue for Today . . .

THE RISE AND FALL OF HERMANN GOERING—Willi Frischauer. 309 pages, illustrated. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company $3.50

In the minds of many, the name Hermann Goering recalls the fat man in Hitler's entourage. His name means buffoon, bully, art collector; a man once ridiculed and feared by much of the Western world. It comes as a surprise to learn that Goering was all these things and yet human, too. *The Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering* presents Goering the man, as differentiated from Goering the product of propaganda. His war record as an aviator in the first World War attests to his personal bravery; so do the many accounts of his actions in later years. His life presents such a mass of contradictions that an analytical resume is difficult. He was sentimental and cruel. He was fiercely loyal to Hitler and the Nazi ideologies and yet helped Jewish friends to escape. He had a keen mind and yet was responsible for errors so great as to have directly contributed to the collapse of his country.

As a biography, the book leaves much detail to the reader's imagination. As a novel, using the story of a man's life as a vehicle for the portrayal of a period, it makes for interesting reading. To the seeker of details, a bibliography containing 57 sources of additional material can be found in the rear of the book.

The author was, like Hitler, an Austrian. By 1935, the political climate of his native land had become unsuited to an ardent anti-Nazi, and he went to England. His writing is stamped with realism and is free from a bias which, if present, would be understandable.

The importance of this biography lies in the nature of the work. The Germany of today derives from the Germany of Goering. An easily-read sketch of yesterday's Germany gives a background for what one sees in the morning paper. History made palatable is the virtue of the book.

Reviewed by LtCol V. S. Croizat

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

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